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Intergenerational Equity in Fiscal
Policy Reform
MICHAEL DORAN'
I.

INTROOUCTION

Previous generations have used government fiscal policy to transfer
resources from themselves to their successors and from their successors to themselves; current generations engage in similar intergenerational transfers. Policymakers, however, do not customarily evaluate
the intergenerational fairness of fiscal policy in any rigorous way. This
follows in part from uncertainty about how to engage the underlying
questions. By contrast, policymakers generally rely heavily on formal
assessments of how fiscal policy promotes or undermines fairness
among members of current generations. They regularly scrutinize tax,
appropriations, and entitlement decisions to determine whether particular groups have undue advantages or disadvantages in the distribution or redistribution of wealth. Although policymakers may hold
markedly diverse views of what constitutes intragenerational fairness,
they share a broad consensus about its importance.
Academics have taken seriously the idea that proper evaluation of
fiscal policy requires a rigorous assessment of intergenerational equity, and they have labored 10 provide policymakers wilh analytic
tools and normative standards to that end. In recent years, public finance economists have developed and refined formal models for measuring intergenerational effects; most prominent among these are
"fiscal gap accounting" and "generational accounting."1 Philosophers,
lawyers, and economists have advanced normative frameworks for assessing intergenerational distributional outcomes. The overarching
objective of these inquiries is to provide the foundation for evaluating
the intergenerational fairness of fiscal policy decisions, just as public
finance theory, legal theory, and political philosophy already provide
• Associate Professor, University of Virginia School or Law. For guidance on this
project and helpful comments on drafts, many thanks 10 Alan Auerbach, Lily Batchelder,
Bill Bratto n, Neil Bucbanan. Stephen Cohen , Mitchell Kane. Oaryl Levinson, Ron
Pearlman , Alex Raskolnikov, Jim Ryan , Deborah Schenk, Dan Shaviro, Mark
Warshawsky, Elhan Yale, and George Yin. Michael Kopp, lIyse Stempler, and Carrene
Walker provided excellent research assistance.
I See Section liLA.
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the foundation for evaluating the intragenerational fairness of those
decisions.
This Article argues for skepticism on these points. More specifically, it argues that the idea of evaluating government fiscal policy
along the dimension of intergenerational equity is largely misguided.
In sharp contrast to the intra generational distribution of wealthwhere government policy plays an active and commanding role in
transferring resources between and among different groups-the intergenerational distribution of wealth is determined mainly by decisions of private actors that [all outside government policy and that
may blunt or even reverse the distributional effects of government
policy. Unless a far greater share of intergenerational transfers is
brought within the scope of government fiscal policy through such un~
likely measures as the confiscatory taxation of gifts and inheritances,
any coherent framework for evaluating intergenerational equity must
incorporate the total distribution and redistribution of wealth across
generations, whether determined by fiscal policy, nonfiscal policy, or
private activity. That leaves little place for drawing informative conclusions from isolated analysis of fiscal policy.
Part II examines the substantial normative problems encountered
by efforts to evaluate intergenerational equity. Most significant
among these is the framing problem. Efforts to understand inlergenerational equity require the construction of hard but nonetheless arbitrary boundaries between different aspects of government
fiscal policy, between fiscal policy and other segments of government
policy, and between government activity and nongovernment activity.
Outcomes that might appear inequitable when considered only as a
matter of fiscal policy can appear entirely defensible when considered
against the background of government policy as a whole; but those
same outcomes might appear inequitable when considered against the
entire intergenerational distribution of wealth resulting from all government and nongovernment activity. This framing problem distinguishes inlergenerational normative inquiries from intragenerational
normative inquiries. In addition, efforts to evaluate intergenerational
equity must resolve difficulties presented by the absence of fixed inputs and the need to coordinate the demands of intergenerational equity with basic norms of liberal democracy. Collectively, these
problems suggest that policymakers should be cautious in treating intergenerational equity as a compelling objective of government fiscal
policy.
Part III brackets these normative difficulties to consider the analytic
problems presented by the formal public finance models for measuring intergenerational effects. As argued there, these models do not
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provide a full account of how fiscal policy distri butes benefits and burdens across generations, and the parti al account that they do provide
yields results th at are far too incomplete to suppo rt robust judgments
abo ut intergenerational equity. Altho ugh these mode ls facilitate
rough conclusions abo ut the intergenerational effects of particular
government progra ms, they do not provide a suffi cient basis fo r making hard evaluative judgments abo ut fiscal po licy reform .
Part IV examines intergeneratio nal equity from a different approach. It considers the possibility that pOlicymakers could relegate
the problem of intergenerational fa irness entirely to the political process. Allho ugh th ere are o bvious d ifficul ties with this approach- including the un avoid able fact that not all interested people can
participate in the politi ca l process when decisio ns affec ting the m are
made-it would allow fo r at least partial poLiti cal resolution of intergene rational questions. In particul ar, the fact of ubiquitous intergenerat io nal altruism amo ng overl apping generatio ns suggests a
limited basis fo r trusting the po litical process with intergeneratio nal
questio ns no less than with intragenerational q uestions.
II.

NO RMAT IVE PItO HL EMS IN A SSESS INC I NTERCENERATIONAL EQ UITY

A co nclusion about the equity of particul ar intergenerational effects
of governm ent fiscal policy necessarily presupposes a normative account of intergenerational equity. But any such normative account
immediately confronts substantial problems. Q uite apart from the diffi culty of identi fy ing or establishin g consensus abo ut the substantive
content of equi ty (which prese nts challenges in both intergene ratio nal
and intragenerational settings) , attempts to set forth a normative account of in te rgenerational equity must overcome fr aming, input, and
coordin ation probl ems. These di ffic ulties, which are vexing but manageable in the context of intragenera tional equity, present genuin e obstacles to assessing intergenerational eq uity.
A.

The Framing Problem

There is a basic conundrum in determining what exactl y sho uld be
included when evaluatin g intergeneratio nal equity in government fisca l policy.2 This problem is fo undational: Any effort to measure and
then assess th e intergenerational effects of government policy requires
the drawing of clea r but inesca pably arbitrary boundaries-such as
2 The analysis in this Section benefits from Daryl Levinson 's study of commo n law tra nsactional frames in constitutional adjudication. See Daryl J . Levinson, Framing Transactio ns in Constitu tional Law, 11 1 Yale L.J. 13 11 (2002) (arguing that common law
transactional framing is problematic whe n dealing with constilUlionallaw issues).
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between different segments of fiscal policy , between fiscal policy and
other segments of government policy, or between all government activity and alJ nongovernment activity. Ultimately, the most coherent
and defensible frame is one that does not distinguish between the intergenerational effects of government decisions and the intergenerationa I effects of nongovernment decisions. That expansive frame,
however, tells us very little about how we should structure or reform
government fiscal policy to achieve intergenerational equity. Instead ,
it locates the normative question within the realms of moral and political philosophy, so that the immediate relevance of government fiscal
policy is almost vanishingly small. Narrower frames, such as those
that focus only on discrete government programs, can provide the
comfort of specific policy prescriptions, but the prescriptions are as
arbitrary as the frames themselves.
1.

The Narrow Frame of Government Programs

Perhaps the most obvious point of departure in framing the normative account of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy is examination
of specific government tax and transfer programs that have intergenerational effects. Among these, the intergenerational transfers
under the federal Social SecurityJ program appear compelling. The
original decision to establish Social Security as a fully funded and
modest program of "social insurance" was overtaken within a few
years by a decision to operate the program on an unfunded basis and
by repeated decisions to expand its scope. 4 As a result, the benefits
paid to early program participants far exceeded the economic value of
their contributions, and the program redistributed wealth from later
participants to early participants.s In present value, those intergenerational transfers amount to approximately $13 trillion, which is
roughly the current size of the U.S. economy.6 Additionally, the long3 Throughout this discussion, the term "Social Security" refers specifically to the program of Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits set fonh in Tille II
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.c. § 401 et scq.
4 See W. Andrew Achcnbaurn. Social Security; Visions and Revisions 32-37 (1986);
Martha Derthick. Policymaking for Social Security 213-92 (979). For additional accounts
of the original legislation and the development of the program, see generally Arthur J.
Altmeyer, The Formative Years of Social Sccurity (1966); Edward D. Berkowitz, Robert
Ball and the Politics of Social Security 164-213 (2003); 1. Douglas Brown, The Genesis of
Social Security in America (1%9): Jerry R. Cates, Insuring Inequality: Administrative
Leadership in Social Security, 1935-54 (1983); Wilbur J . Cohen, Retirement Policies Under
Social Security (1957); Charles McKinley & Robert W. Frase, Launching Social Security;
A CaplUre-and-Record Account. 1935-1937 (1970); Edwin E. Wine, The Development of
the Social Security Act 3-108 (1%2).
5 Achenbaum , note 4, at 32-37.
6 See note 38.
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term insolvency of Social Security all but ensures that there will be
further intergene rational transfers under the program.
Surely, then, if considerations of intergenerational equity are at all
relevant to fiscal policy , they are relevant to Social Security. Policymakers interested in assessing the intergenerational equity of the Social Security program would want to know what justified decisions
made in the 1930's and in subsequent decades to impose net burdens
on the young and unborn for the benefit of the middle-aged and elderly. Similarly, policymakers who consider possible program reform
today would want to understand the obligations of current participants to future participants. But however intuitively attractive those
questions may seem, they are the wrong questions to ask. To understand why, it is necessary to consider the conventional account about
Social Security and intergenerational equity more closely.
Social Security, the federal government's largest program for redistributing wealth,7 provides retirement, survivor, and disability benefits
to nearly 50 million participants and their beneficiaries. s The taxes
that finance the program comprise employment taxes on the earnings
of most employed and self-employed individuals9 and income taxes on
the benefits of certain program participants. to The federal government accounts fo r these taxes through two trust fund s. t l The trust
7 Congo Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook 19 (2005), available at http:{/
www.cbo.gov/ft pdocs/69xxJdoc6982112-15-LongTermO utlook. pdf; C. Eugene Steuerle &
Jo n M. Bakija, Re tooling Social Security for the 21st CenlU ry: Right and Wrong Approaches to Reform 91 (1994).
8 The 2008 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance a nd Federal Disability Insura nce Trust Funds, H.R. Doc. No. 1l0- 104, at 2
(2008), available at hltp:llwww.ssa.gov/OACffTRffR08l1l{)8.pdr.
9 Employees and their employers pay a combi ned tax equal to 12.4% of employee earnings. IRC §§ 310 1(a), 3111(a). Although the tax nominally is imposed separately o n employees and employers, employees ordinarily bear the full cost of the lax through lower
wages. Peter A. Diamond & Pe te r R. Orszag, Saving Social Security; A Balanced Approach 24 (2004). Self-employed individuals pay a tax equal to 12.4% of earnings. IRC
§ 1401(a). One-half of the 12.4% tax paid by the self-employed individual is deductible for
purposes of the federal income tax. IRC § 164(f). The deduction makes the effective tax
rate on the self-cmployed individual JUSt under 12%, and the exclusion of the employe r's
share of the 12.4% tax from an employee's income makes the effecti ve tax rate on the
employee just under 12% . See Daniel Shaviro, Making Sense of Social Security Reform 11
(2000). In all cases, earnings are taxed onl y up to a maxim um amount set by sta tute. lRC
§§ 3121(a)( I), 1402(b)(I).
10 Up to 50% of benefit payments become includi ble in gross income if the sum of an
individual's (or married couple's) modified adjusted gross income and one-half of the individual's (or married couple's) Socia l Securi ty benefits exceeds $25,000 (or $32,000 in the
case of a married couple). IRe § 86. Separately, a portion of benefi t payments received
by a non reside nt alien is includible in gross income (subject to contra ry treatment under a
bilateralt:!x treaty). IRC § 871(a)(3).
11 42 U.S.c. § 401 (a) (creating the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund
and appropria ting employment tax reven ues to that fund); 42 U.S.c. § 401(b) (creating the
Federal Disability Insurance Trust Fund and app ropriating e mployme nt tax revenues to
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funds , which consist of accounting entries on the general books of the
U.S. TreasurY ,12 se rve as the only source of program benefits.13
Through the payment of cash benefits to program participants and
their beneficiaries, Social Security mitigates the risk that retirement,
death , or disability will result in lost or reduced income. Retirement
benefits are determined as a function of the participant 's earnings,14
are payabl e both to the participant and to the participant's spouse,lS
and are indexed for changes in the cost of Iiving.16 Survivor and disa·
bility benefits generally are determined under modified versions of
the benefit formula used for retirement benefits.17
As first enacted in 1935, the Social Security program did not envision significant intergenerational red ist ribution. The Social Security
Act of 1935 18 provided for tax collections to begin in 1937 but delayed
benefit payments until 1942. 19 The prefunding of the program drew
criticism from both the political left, which objected to the modest
that fund); Social Security Amendments of 1983. Pub. L No. 98·21 § 121(e). 97 Stat. 83
(appropriating income tax revenues under IRC § 86 and IRC § 871(a)(3) to the trust
funds). See generally Congo Research Service. Social Security: The Trust Fund (2005).
available at h t tp:lffpc.state .gov/documen ts/organization/51264.pdf.
12 Although they do not hold assets separate from the other assets of the U.S. Treasury.
the (rust fu nds do meaSure the capacity of the Social Security program to make benefit
payments as they become due. See genera1\y Shaviro. note 9, at 88·90. As with benefit
payments, the admi nistrative costs of Social Security are charged against the trust funds.
42 U.s.c. § 401(g). Amounts credited to the trust funds in excess of current obligations a re
used to acquire Treasury securities backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.
42 U.S.c. § 401(d). Interest and redemption proceeds from the securities arc used for
program Obligations or a re reinvested in additional Treasury securities. 42 U.S.c. § 401(f).
13 42 U.s.c. § 401(h).
14 A participant's Social Securi ty benefits are determined by reference to he r "primary
insurance amount" ("PIA "). 42 U.S.c. § 415(a). The participant's PIA, in turn, is dete r·
mined by reference to her "averaged indexed monthly earnings" ("A IME"). 42 U.S.c.
§ 415(b). AIME is the average of the participant's indexed monthly earnings for her 35
years of highest earnings. Id.
15 42 U.S.c. § 402(b) (wife's benefits); 42 U.S.c. § 402(c) (husband's benefits). A mi nor
or disabled child of a panicipant who has begun to receive retiremen t benefits is also eligi·
ble for benefit payments. 42 U.S.c. § 402(d). Aggregate benefit payments 10 a fam ily
based on the earnings of a single participant are subject to an overall cap. 42 U.S.c.
§ 403(a).
16 42 U.s.c. § 415(i).
11 Survivor benefits consist of a small single.sum payment, 42 U.S.c. § 402(i), and
monthly benefi t payments; the mont hly benefits are payable to the deceased participant 's
surviving spouse, 42 U.S.c. § 402(e)·(g), minor o r disabled child, 42 U.S.c. § 402(d), and
dependent parent, 42 U.S.C § 402(h). Disability benefits are payable to a participant who
becomes disabled prior to reaching full retirement age. 42 U.s.c. § 423. A disabled par·
ticipanl's spouse and minor or disabled chitd also receive benefit payments. 42 U.s.c.
§ 402(b)·(d). Both (he survivor and disability benefits are indexed to changes in the cost of
living, 42 U.S.c. § 415(i), and are subject 10 per famil y limits, 42 U.s.c. § 403(a).
18 Pub. L. No. 74·271 , ch. 531, 49 Sta t. 620.
19 Derthick, nOie 4, at 213· 14, 429.
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benefits,2o and the political right, which o bjected to the accumul ation
of large reso urces under government control. 21 For this reason , Congress adopted the Social Security Act Amendments of 193922 to put
Social Securit y on an unfunded (or "pay-as-you-go") basis. Under
that legislation , Congress effectively spent down the substantial anticipated program reserves, before they had accumulated, by making benefits more generous for early program participants.23 Congress
further expanded program benefits throughout the 1950's, 1960's, and
early 1970'S.24 Not until legislation in 1977 and 1983 did Congress appreciably reduce progra m benefits.25
Conventional analysis argues th at the consequence of the 1939 legislation and subsequent program expansions was the redistribution of
wealth across generations. 26 Because benefits paid out of the program
are finan ced onl y by taxes paid into the program and interest on those
taxes, Social Security fun ctions as an e laborate set of zero-sum transacti ons.27 If any participant receives benefits th at exceed the economic value of her contributions, a second participant must rece ive
benefits that fall short of the economic value of his contributions by
an amount equal to the excess be nefits received by Ihe fi rst participant. If the second participant does nOI bea r that cost, it must be carried as a program debt and passed on to a third , fo urth, or later
participant . As with any de bt, the cost to whomever pays for the ex20 Achenbaum, note 4, at 30.
Id. a t 30; Derthic k, note 4, at 90-91, 143; Altmeye r, no te 4, at 88-89. The program was
expected to accum ulate to $47 billion by 1980. Derthick. note 4, at 232-33; Altmeyer, note
4, at 88.
22 Pub. L. No. 76-379, ch. 666, 53 Slat. 1360.
:0 Achenba um, no te 4. at 3. 32. Specifically, Congress added benefits for the spouses
and depe ndents of retired participants and for the survivors of deceased participants,
ame nded the benefi t formula to increase benefit s for ma ny early participants, defe rred an
increase in e mployment taxes, and accelerated the payment of the firs t prog ram benefits
from 1942 to 1940. Achenba um, note 4, a t 32-33; Derth ick, note 4, at 47, 214, 236, 429.
24 Achenbaum, note 4, at 38-60; Derthick, note 4, at 429-32.
25 Ache nbaum, no te 4, at 67-74, 81-99; see the Social Secu ri ty Ame nd ments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 and the Social Security Amend ments of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-21, 97 Stat. 65. For a history of the 1977 legislation, see Derthick, note 4, at 381 -411; for
a his tory of the 1983 legislation . see gene rally Paul Light, Artful Wor k: The Politics of
Social Security Reform (1985).
16 See Cong. Budget O ffice, The Outlook. for Social Securi ty 18 (2004), available at
htt p://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocsl55xx/doc5530106- 14-socialsecurity.pdf. See gene rally Peter A.
Dia mond, Social Securi ty Refonn 65-66 (2002) (stating that design of Social Securit y in
early years caused a large redistribution to initial cohorts of reti rees); Michael J. Bosk.in,
Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Douglas J. Puffert & John S. Shoven, Social Security: A Financial
Appraisal Across and Wit hin Ge nerations, 40 Nat'l Tax J. 19.22 (1987) (stating that Social
Securi ty "has been a majo r ve hicle for transferring resources from the yo unger, richer,
working generation to the older, poorer, retired generation").
27 Sylveste r J. Schieber & John S . Shoven, The Real Deal: The History and Future of
Social Security 11 2-13 (1999).
21
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cess benefit received by the first participant will be the original
amount of the excess plus interest for the intervening period. But because the net transfer has been made, the question is not whether but
by whom it will be borne. 28
The repeated expansions of Social Security effected precisely this
result. Under the 1939 legislation , the program immediately began to
pay windfall benefits~that is, benefits exceeding the economic value
of taxes-to early participants.29 Subsequent legislation both increased the amount of these windfall benefits and broadened the
group that received them. 30 The magnitude of the windfalls is apparent from the high internal rates of return that early participants experienced on their program taxes.3 ! The cohort born in 1880, which
reached age 65 in 1945, experienced a 25% rate ofreturn on its Social
Security taxes; the cohort born in 1890, which reached age 65 in 1955,
experienced an 18% rate of return; and the cohort born in 1900, which
reached age 65 in 1965, experienced a 12% rate of return .32 In some
cases, program benefits were sufficient to effect a full refund not only
of lifetime employment taxes, with interest, but also of lifetime federal
income taxes. 33
The windfall benefits for early program participants were financed
(as a cash flow matter) by participants who were actively working and
paying employment taxes and who were accruing benefit claims in
28 Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 4 ("[OJnce that debt is determined, its COSt cannot be
avoided: the only issue is how we finance that cost across different generations."); see also
Joh n Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldes, Social Security Money's Worth
4·16 (NBER Working Paper No. W6722, 1998), available at http://www.nher.org/papersl
w6722.
29 See Achenbaum, note 4, at 32-37.
](I Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37; Steuerle & Bakija, note 7, at 108.
31 Geanakoplos e t al.. note 28, at 4-5 ("The real 'inte rnal rate of return' is the inflationcorrected discount rate that equates, for each individual, the present value of the stream of
social securit y benefits to thc present value of the stream of the taxes paid.").
32 Dean R. Leimer, Cohort-Specific Measures of Lifetime Net Social Securit y Transfers
(Social Security Administration Office of Research and Statistics Working Paper Series
No. 59, 1994), al 16, available at hup:llwww.socialsecurity.gov/policy/research_sub41.html
[he reinafter Leimer I]. Note that these are real rates of return, that they have been calculated o nly as to the old-age and survivors insurance componcnt of the program, and that
the values presented in the text have been rou nded. Many of the results reported in
Leimer I have been updated in Dean R. Leimer, Cohort-Specific Measures of Life time
Social Security Taxes and Benefits (Social Security Administration Office of Research and
Statistics Working Paper Series No. 110, 2007), available at hnp:lfwww.ssa.gov/policy/docsl
workingpaperslwpllO.pdf [hereinafter Leimer IIJ. The methodology in Leimer II diverges
(ro m the methodology of Leimer I. Leimer II, supra, at 50·52. The results under Leimer
II, however, for cohorts born before 1940 generally follow quite closely the results (or
those cohorts unde r Leimer I; by contrast, the resul1s "for the moot distant [future] cohorts
differ substantially" between Leimer II and Leimer I. Id . at 53-54.
3) Steuerle & Bakija , note 7. at II I
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their own righl.34 Once those younger participants became eli gibl e for
ben efit s, their benefit payments in turn were financed (as a cash flow
matter) by their own successors' taxes. J5 As the program has moved
forward, each participant has received the benefits promised to her,
but the cost of the windfall benefits to the early participants has never
been paid off. J6 In fact, it has on ly increased through con tinued program expansion and accumulating inte rest.37 As of 2008, Ihe unpaid
cost of the implicit debl attributable to ea rly program participants
stands at approximately $13 triliion.J8
Well-reasoned estimates locate the turning point from net transfers
out of the program to net transfers into the program wilh the cohort
born in 1938. 39 That is, previous cohorts have received and will receive more fr om the program than the economic va lue of their taxes,
but the 1938 cohort and succeeding cohorts have rece ived and will
receive less th an the economic va lue of their taxes.40 Thus, as compared to the 25% internal rate of return enjoyed by the 1880 cohort,
the 1938 coho rt will have a rate of return of less than 3%.41 The cohort born in 1960 is proj ected to rece ive a 2.5% rate of return, and the
cohort born in 1990 is projected to receive a 2.6% rate of return. 41:
For cohorts born through 2038, the rates of return remain below 3%.43
To put the point in different terms, for program participants born after
the Second World War, 33 cents of every dollar in employment taxes
finance their own Social Security benefits (assuming a market rate of
:w Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37.
Shaviro, nOte 9, at 25-26.
.l6 Schieber and Shoven argue that the low ratio of beneficiaries to ac tive workers during
this era racilitated benefit expansion precisely because the active workers would nOt experience the full burden or the increased benefit obligations. Schieber & Shoven, note 27, at
96-97. Simila rly, Derthick argues that the fact thllt "(nJearly all of the early participants
have late r received far more than they had paid in taxes" reinforced political inclinations
towa rd program expansion. Dert hick, note 4, at 6, 8.
]7 Leimer I, note 32, at 43.
}8 See Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 72 (estimating implicit debt at $11.6 trillion as of
2004); Geanakoplos etlll., note 28, a t 21·22 (estimating implicit debt at $9.7 trillion as of
1997). Adjusting those estimates by the consumer price index for the intervening periods-admittedly, a very rough met hod for updating the values-puts the amount at just
about $13 trillion for 2008.
39 Leimer I, note 32_ at 30, 71; Diamond & Orszag. no te 9, at 70-72.
40 Diamond & Orszag, note 9, at 37, 208-09; see also Geanak.oplos ct aI., note 28, at 6-7.
Leime r II, however, locates the tu rni ng point at the cohort born in 1932. Leimer II, note
32, at 60.
41 Leimer I, note 32, at 69, 71; Lei mer II , no te 32, at 61.
42 Leimer II, note 32, al 61-62. The projccted rates of return ror the 1960 and 1990
cohorts are almost certainly tOO optimistic: in both cases, it has been assumed (deliberuely
but counterfaclually) thai there will be no increase in program taxes or reduction in program benefits to ensure long-term progra m solvency. Id. at 59
4] Id. at 63. Again, this assumes no increase in program taxes or reduction in program
benefits.
)j
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return) ; the remaining 67 cents represent a pure tax to fin ance the
transfers made to earlier participants. 4 4 Through below-market internal rates of return, participants born after 1937 service the debt incurred in the transfers to participants born before 1938. Because of
the zero-sum nature of the program , the total burden imposed on the
participants born after 1937 ultimately must equal the $13 trillion of
windfall benefits paid to the participants born before 1938,45
lntergenerational redistribution under Social Security is not purely
historical; the long-term financial instability of th e program effectively
ensures that the re will be additional transfers among current and future generations. Although Social Security is solvent in the short
term,46 all long-term measures un ambiguously indicate that the program is not solvent over the next 75 years.41 Congress could respond
44 Steven Caldwell, Melissa Favreaull, Alia Ganlman, Jagadeesh Gokhale, Thomas
Johnson & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Social Security's Treatment of Postwar Ame ricans. 13
Tax PoI'y & Econ. 110, 112, 134 (1999).
45 Jo hn Geanakoplos, Olivia S. Mitchell & Stephen P. Zeldas, Social Security: In What
Form?, in Framing the Social Securi ty Debate 113, 146 (R. Douglas Arnold, Michael J.
Graetz & Al icia H. Mun nell eds.. 1998) ("[iJnevitably, cohorts born afte r 1937 must give up
in the aggregate thc whole" amount provided as windfall benefits to cohorts born before
1938). Leimer, however, notes strong reservations about such conclusions. Hc argues that
the "legacy debt concept a nd measure are critically sensitive to the choicc of the interest
rate sedes deemed app ropriate for the eva luation of program o utcomes" and that "the
typical practice lin the literature] of using the trust fund or othe r market inlerest rate unadjusted for risk ... may produce a quantitatively misleading o r even qualitatively invalid
indication of any 'debt' or ' burden' imposed by the program on present and future cohorts." Leimer II , no te 32, at 58. Although it might be appealing to argue tha t legislators
we re unaware of these intergeneratio nal effects in the early years of the program, those
effects in fact have long been recognized. M. Albert Linto n, an insurance executive, urged
the first Social Securit y Advisory Council during the late 1930's not 10 impose ne t burdens
on future generations. Derthick, note 4, at 234-35. Representative Jo hn Byrne objected to
the 1950 expa nsion of the program on the basis of the intergenerational redistribution tha t
would result. Id. at 45. He pointedly asked on the House floor how policymakers could
justify imposing tax rates on futu re gene rations thai they would not be willing to impose on
curre nt generations. Id. at 241-42. In their 1950 stud y, twO Brookings a nalysts detailed the
substantial intergenera tio nal redistribution under the expanding program. Lewis Meriam
& Karl T. Schlotterbeck, The Cost and financing of Social Security 173-76 (1950).
46 Trustees, note 8, at 2, 7, 32-42.
~1 Under the principal long-term measure-the ca lculat ion of "actuarial balance"-Ihe
trust funds are projected to be exha usted in 204 1: at that time, the program no longer will
be able to make full benefit payments. Trustees, nOle 8, at 2-3, 43, 53. Instead, benefit
payme nts will ha ve 10 be reduced 10 78% of promised benefits (and will fall aga in in 2082
to 75% of promised benefits). Id. at 8, 18. This 75.yea r actua rial defici t could be closed by
an immediate and perma nent increase in Social Securi ty taxes of 1.7 percentage points, an
immediate and permanent reduction in Social Security benefits of 11.5%. or immediate
transfers from the government's general fund of $4.3 trillion. Id. at II, 18,58. If the same
assessme nt of act uarial balance we re made over the infinite fut ure, the actuarial deficit
would require an immed iate and permanent increase in Social Securit y taxes of 3.2 percentage points, an immediate and permanen t red uction in Social Security benefits of
19.8%, or immediate transfers from the government's gene ral fund of $13.6 trillion. Id. at
13,58. The other long·term measures- the "closed group unfunded obligation" and the

2008] INTERGEN ERATIONAL EQU ITY IN FISCA L POLICY REFORM

251

to the financial instability either by enacting or failing to enact legislative reform of the program; in either case, furth er inter generational
transfers under the program are all but inevitable.
In the absence of legislative reform , there will occur a time in the
middle of this century when benefits due under Social Security will
exceed the sum of trust fund assets and program revenues. At that
point, program administrators would not have the lega l authority to
make full benefit payments;48 instead, they would have to reduce benefit payments by at least 22%.49 These reductions would lower the
amounts received by retired participants; the reductions, however,
would not reduce the amounts paid into the program by those participants. Thus, the primary effect of the reductions would be to impose
larger program burdens on participants receiving benefits at or after
the middle of the century. By contrast, participants who have received benefits in the past or who are receiving benefit payments today would bear none of the cost of program insolvency.
Any legislative reform intended to prevent or mitigate insolvency
necessa rily would involve a reduction in program benefits, an increase
in revenues , or a combination of tbe two. For example, Congress
could decide to prevent insolvency through a one-time lump-sum tax,
payable by participants then subject to employment taxes, equal to the
entire program shortfall; this would impose the full burden of insolvency on one or two generations alive and working at the time the tax
"open group unfunded obligatio n"-also indicate program insolve ncy. rd. a t 60-63. Nonetheless, there 1Ire critics who argue that program sustainability is not presently in question.
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security and Government Deficits: Whe n Sho uld we
Worry?, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 257,288 (2007) ("the purported long-te rm challe nges facing
Social Securit y either are un like ly to occur or at least do not require immediate action to
add ress possible fu ture problems"); Dean Baker & Mark Weisbrot, Social Securi ty: The
Phony Crisis 21-37 (1999) (arguing that the standa rd projections provide no basis for serious concern about the program's fi nancial survival) .
.s The Social Securit y Act provides tha t benefits may be paid only from the trust fund s.
42 U.S.c. § 401(h). The Antideficiency Act prohi bi ts any offi cer o r employee of the fed·
eral governmen t from maki ng or aut horizing any expenditure or obligation tha t exceeds
the amount available through an appropriation or fund . 31 U.5.c. § 1341(a)(t)(A). Some
ha ve argued that, in the event of trust fund exhaustion, participants would have a cause of
action against the government for unpaid benefits. See generally Kathleen Romig, Congo
Research Serv., Social Security: What Would Hap pen if the Trust Funds Ra n Qut? (2007).
That point is interesting but irrelevant: Because the courts lack constitutional authori ty to
make federal appropriations, a declarative judgment that a participant is entitled to fu ll
benefits would have nO effect absent an additional appropriation by Congress to fund
those benefits. See generally Thomas J. Nicola, Whether Entitlement to Full Social Security Benefits Depends on Solvency of the Social Securit y Trust Funds if Congress Does Not
Change the Law, Congo Research Servo Memorand um (1998), in Social Security Reform:
Hearings Before the Task Force on Social Security of the H. Comm . on the Budget, l06th
Congo 223·28 ( \999).
49 Trustees, note 8, at 8, 18.
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is imposed. 5o At the other extreme, Congress could cancel the program outright-collecting no additional taxes and paying no additional benefits. This would place the full burden on the participants
(many of them elderly) who would have paid taxes into the program
but would not yet have received their full scheduled benefits.S] Related but less extreme reforms could include a long-term increase in
employment taxes, a long-term decrease in benefits, or a combination
of the two. The intergenerational incidence of these reforms would
depend on the exact terms of the tax increase or benefit decrease, but
plainly different generations would be affected differently.
2.

The Brouder Frames of Government and Nongovernment
Activities

As illustrated by the substantial intergenerational transfers that
have occurred and likely will occur under Social Security, the narrow
frame of government programs yields results that appear normatively
relevant to the question of intergenerational equity. The legislative
expansions of the Social Security program that began soon after its
enactment transferred resources roughly equal to the prese nt size of
the U.S. economy from participants who were not then able to participate in the political process to participants who were in full control of
their political destiny through their eJected representatives. The apparently self-seiving redistribution of wealth seems to provide a compelling example of intergenerational inequity and a strong caution
about reforms that might be undertaken by current generations to
prevent or mitigate program insolvency later in this century.
But that normative conclusion is contingent on the selection of the
analytical frame, and the selection of the analytical frame is fundamentally arbitrary, inherently skewed, and certainly wrong. Social Security, like other aspects of government fiscal policy, does not exist in
isolation. 52 The collection of employment taxes and the payment of
Social Security benefits are not the only tax and transfer interactions
between program participants and the government. Instead, fiscal
policy sets up myriad points of contact between government and individuals, and there is no reason-apart from pure semantics~to exso Geanakoplos et aI., note 28. at 39-40.
~1

~2

Id.

Most government transfer and spending programs arc not even self-financed in the
manner of Social Security. Although Social Security benefits and administrative costs are
funded by dedicated employment and income taxes, most other programs- such as food
stamps, Medicaid, national defense, and scientific research- are funded at least in part by
general government reve nues. Moira Herbst, How Uncle Sam Spends Your Tall Money,
Bus. Week Online, Apr. 13, 2007, available al hltp:llwww.businessweek.comlbwdaily/dn.
nashfco ntentlapr2007/db200704 13_898070.htm.
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ami ne on ly some of these points when assessing intergenerat ional
fairness. It makes little sense to conclude-as has been argued ve ry
forcefullySJ-that the first generation born after the Second World
War was treated unfairly by Social Security if, taking a broader pe rspective, it becomes clear that Med icare benefits, govern ment-financed research in gerontological medicine, preferential treatment for
senior citizens under the federal income tax, and other aspects of government fiscal policy offset the net burden under Social Security. The
arbitrariness of the narrow frame becomes self-evident when one considers that the assessme nt of Social Secu rity as intergenerationally fa ir
or unfair could change entirely if Congress simply re-labeled the program to include other aspects of government fiscal policy that provide
net benefits to the seemingly disfavored cohorts: Suddenly, net program losers could become ne t program winners as the direction of
intergenerational transfers changed with the new boundaries between
Social Security and othe r programs.
That suggests that framing the normative assessment of intergenerational equity must include all aspects of government fiscal policy.54
But thi s remains insufficient. The broadened frame sti ll sets arbitrary
boundaries that leave out aspects of govern ment policy relevant to
any sensible evalu ation of intergenerational equ ity. For example ,
analysis under a "total fiscal policy" frame finds that the generations
born prior to the Second World War generally were net winners, relative to the post-War generations. not only under the Social Security
program but under government fisca l policy as a whole. 55 Analysis of
government fiscal policy, however, does not capture the costs imposed
and be nefits conferred by other aspects of government policy. The
enormous cont ributions that the federa l government demanded from
these generations during the Second World War do not register as a
fiscal policy cost to them any more than the freedom and prosperity
that their wart ime sacrifices provided register as a fisca l policy benefit
to subsequent ge nerations. 56 Government policies that force mem3) Laurence J. Kotlikoff. Generational Acoounting: Knowing Who Pays, and When, for
What We Spend 193-96 (1992).
s. As discussed in Pari III , fiscal gap and generational accou nting attempt to evaluate
inlergenerational equity using precisely this frame.
5S Kotlikoff. note 53, at 194-95.
~ This point has been made specifically as a criticism of generational accounting. See,
e.g., Richard Goode & c. Eugene Steuerle, Generational Accounts and Fiscal Policy, 65
Tax Notes 1027 , 1029 (Nov. 21 , 1(94) ("Note in this context (generational accounting] that
generations that dedicated lives, as well as forgone earnings, to defense of the country are
not measured as having paid any additional'tax' or having made any additional transfer to
other generations."); Daniel Shaviro, Do Deficits Matter? 159 (1997) ( ~ [Gleneraliona l accounting is limited to fisca l policy and th us mostly cannot adjust for generational differences in benefit from the noncash goods and services tha t the governmcnt provides, in
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bers o f Generation A to fight in battle and then pay outsized public
pensions to its re mainin g me mbers have no t obviously favored o r disfavored Generation A relative to Generarion B, none of whose mem bers are conscripted and all of whose members receive smaller public
pensions. To mak e the same point by looking forward rather th an
backward , a hypothetica l po licy under which government implements
immediate and substantial restrictions o n carbon emissions might impose considerable costs on current generations and confer considerable benefits on future generations. B ut any attempt to assess the
inte rgenerational effects wo uld miss those costs and benefits entirely
if the frame were limited to government fisca l po licy.
Enlarging the fr ame to the next aperture does not eliminate the
ano malies. Arguably, one could attempt to assess the intergeneration al effects of governme nt poli cy in its entire ty. That, of course,
wo uld prese nt real problems of valuing no npecuniary costs (such as
compulsory mili ta ry service) and benefits (such as reduced climate
change) and making such costs and benefits commensurable with each
other and with pecuniary costs and benefits (such as taxes and transfer
payments). Even assuming those problems could be overcome, a
framework broadly defin ed 10 assess the intergenerational equity of
all government policy wo uld make sense only by igno ring the in lergenerational effects of nongovernment acti vities. If nongovernment inte rgenerational transfe rs were small relati ve to government
intergenerational transfe rs, it might be possible to posit a cogent and
mea ningful no rm of intergene rational equity that addresses only government activities. But no ngovernmenl transfers between gene ratio ns
are far 100 l a rge ~n to be igno red in a normative account of inte rgeneratio nal equit y; it makes as little sense to segment government and
nongovernment effects in this context as it does to segment the effects
of o ne gove rnment tax o r transfer program from ano th er. Even when
conceived broadly, governme nt policy is only one medium through
which individuals transfer wealth to or from their successors.58 Although we mighl be able to make interesting observations about how
current generations treat future gene rations thro ugh government policy, those observations hardly provide a sound basis for making judg-

det riment such as regulatory burden, and in no ncash contributions 10 the government such
as conscripted military service:·).
S1 See notes 78·82.
58 See, e.g., Shaviro, note 56, at 160 ("[Elven focusing purely on the overall ac tivilies of
the governme nt provides tOO narrow a focus fo r assessing generational equit y.
[Glovernme nt policy e mbraces only a small portion of the IOta l interactio n between pre·
sent and futu re generations.").
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ments about intergenerational equity if we systematically ignore all
nongovernment acti vity that complements or offsets those policies. s9
An expansive frame that encompasses both governme nt activity
and nongovernment acti vity, however, ca nnot yield conclusions that
deliver any meaningful normative payoff about gove rnment policy as
such. Within this frame, gove rnment policy is simply on e aspect of
intergenerational transfers Uust as, by an alogy, Social Security is only
one aspect of government fiscal policy). At that point, the question
about whether government treats different generations fairly devolves
into a nearly amorphous question about whether the sum total of
human history treats diffe rent ge ne ra ti ons fairly. Assessing the in tergenerational effects of government policy- as opposed to the intergenerational effects of everything-requires a less expansive frame.
But th at less expansive fram e would have to treat nongovernment activity as exogenous to governme nt activit y; and one would then be
back into the thick of choosing among narrower and necessarily incomple te frames. Any such choice would be arbitrary, and the norma~
tive conclusions suggested by the fr ame would be ultimately
misleading.60
E ach of the possible frames for evaluating int ergenerational transfe rs is problematic, and none presents itse lf as the cl ear basis for
meaningful normative conclusions about government fiscal pOlicy.
The case always ca n be made that a broader or narrower frame is
more appropriate, and government programs, policies, or actions that
might appea r equitable to futu re generations when the intergenerational effects within one fra me are considered may appea r inequitable
when the effects are considered within a broader or narrower frame. 6 t
59 See, e.g., id. at 153-54.
60 Shaviro cri ticizes generational accounti ng as depe nde nt on too narrow an a nalytic
frame. See Shaviro, note 56. at 159-60. But rat her than rejecting generatio nal acco un ti ng
on that basis, he argues that it is "[plerhaps the best tool for enha ncing our understanding
of who wins and loses [rom al ternative reforms. " Daniel Shaviro, Unde rstanding the
Generatio nal Challenge , 75 Tax No tes 7 14, 716 (May 5, 1997). Shaviro's answer to the
fra ming problem is to widen the scope so that the ques tion of inte rgene rat ional equity is
posed as to the "overall natu re and amo unt of what we take and wha t we leave"- which
"depends in part on savi ngs rates and ne t capital formation, construed 10 include human
capital a nd all changes to depletable and degrada ble reso urces." Sha vi ro, no te 56, at 164
(empbasis in o riginal). Again, that very expansive frame cannot yield meaningful no rmati ve conclusions abo ut the intergenerational effects of what government does. Shaviro
parHy ac knowledges this, arg uing that the "broad perspective merely desc ri bes the scope
of our no rmative inquiry; it does nm immediately suggest any answers." Id. Bu t that assessment is too optimistic; what the expansive frame does suggest is that intergene rational
equity is not a cohe rent end of govern ment policy as such.
61 As Levinson puts the point in the contex t of constitu tional adjud ication, de te rm inations of whe ther a transaction betwee n government and private citizens increases o r
red uces the welfare of the pri vate citizens "depend . .. crucially, on which governme nt
harms and benefits are included wi thin the relevant tra nsaction." Levinson, no te 2, at
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The framing problem can reasonably be set aside where the purpose
of the inquiry is limited. If all we want to know is the intergenerational effects of the taxes and transfers that fall under the government
label of Social Security (assuming that this is worth knowing) , we can
undertake the analysis within that framework. The results, of course,
are limited by the arbitrary parameters of the analysis. But the framing problem becomes more significant when the results are intended
to ground normative conclusions. The judgment that an older generation unduly benefits under the Social Security program at the expense
of later generations implies that, to the extent possible, the older generation should give back its windfall and reverse the inequity. But
that policy prescription appears fundamentally wrong if a broader
frame indicates that the older generation on the whole has been
treated no betler than its successors; and it appears fundamentally
right if a still broader frame indicates that the older generation has
benefited at the expense of those successors after all.
The framing problem is evident in the specific normative accounts
of intergenerational equity advanced by public finance economists
and legal scholars analyzing government fiscal policy. These accounts
necessarily separate fiscal policy from other aspects of government
policy and from nongovernment activity; in so doing. they necessarily
ignore many intergenerational effects that bear on the question of
fairness across generations. Consider the possibility of a "no-transfer
norm " under which government fiscal policy would result in no intergenerational transfers of wealth. 62 This norm has at least a superficial appeal: It purports to effect equal treatment of all generations
because it requires each generation to provide exactly for itself without taking resources from any other generation. But the prescriptive
power of the no-transfer norm is limited by the boundaries of its
frame: The norm has nothing to say about intergenerational transfers
made outside government fiscal policy, which may complement or offset the effects of fiscal policy and which may correct or exacerbate
intergenerational inequities in the status quO. 63 Not much is achieved
by maintaining that intergenerational equity requires fiscal policy not
to tax future generations to pay for consumption by current generations if other aspects of government policy and private activitieswhich by definition fall outside the norm-would have precisely that
effect.
1378. For a parallel argument in the context of measuring the intragenerational distributive effects of tax and non tax policy, see Michael J. Graetz, Paint-by-Numbers Tax Lawmaking, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 609. 657, 661 (1995).
62 Shaviro, note 56, at 152-57.
63 Id. at t53-54.
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Laurence Kotlikoff argues that the proper end of fiscal policy in its
trealment of different generations is "generational balance."64 For
Kotlikoff, generational balance is achieved when government imposes
the same net lax burden on each generation.65 Thus, Kotlikoff's analytic work on generational accounts-which indicates that net tax burdens increased steadily throughout the 20th century and will increase
further for future generations66-demonstrates, in his view, the intergenerational inequity of current government fiscal policy. Kotlikoff's position has the virtue of suggesting specific prescriptive
outcomes: Where generational accounts are out of balance, they
should be rebalanced either by increasing taxes on current generations
or red ucing spending for current generations.67 But, as with the notransfer norm, the payoff of these prescriptive implications is cabined
by the frame. If government confers benefits on future generations or
imposes costs on current generations that are not captured in the analysis-either because the analysis does not incorporate all aspects of
fiscal policy or because the benefits and costs are provided outside
fiscal policy or even outside government policy-the mandate that
government take corrective action to reset the generational balance
becomes fundam entally suspect.
Tyler Cowen offers a more expansive norm of intergenerational equity in what he calls the "principle of growth."68 That principlewhich Cowen grounds in "deep concern for the distant future "69would require structuring fiscal policy to maximize the rate of sustainable economic growth.1° Thus, he would evaluate policy decisions by
"simply ask[ing] whether a given policy is likely to increase or de64 Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218-1 9; Jagadees h Gokhale & Laure nce 1. Kotlikof[, Genera~
tional 1ustice and Generational Accounting, in The Generational Equity Debate 76-82
(John B. Williamson, Diane M. Walls-Roy & Eric R. Kingson eds., 1999).
65 Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218-19; Gokhale & Kotlikoff, no te 64, at 82·83.
66 See Section IILA; Kotlikoff, note 53, at 126·30; Gokhale & Kotlikoff, note 64, at 83-

84.
61 Gokhale & Kotlikofr, note 64, at 82·83; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadees h Gokhale & laurence J. Kotlikoff, Generational Accounts: A Meaningful Alternative to Defici t Accounting, 5 Tax PoI'y & Econ. 55 (199 1) (detailing generational accounts as an alternative to
government deficit accounting and providing alternative solutions for out-of- balance
gene rational accounts).
68 Tyler Cowen, Caring About the Distant Future: Why It Mailers and WhatJt Means,
74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 5, 16 (2007). It is act ually not clear what status Cowen contemplates for
the principle of growth. He refers to it both as a "rough-and-ready rule of policy e val uation" and as "a useful practical rule." Id. at 16-17.
69 Id. at 13.
70 Id. at 16. By "economic growth" he means gross domestic prod uct, modified to include "leisure time, household production, and e nvironmental amenities. " Id. at 17. He
tempcrs his claim by conceding that sustai nable economic growth sho uld not override "inviolable human rights." Id.
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crease the rat e of econom ic growt h."71 His principle suggests that the
choice between current and future consumption generall y should be
resolved in favo r of future consumption.72 This would imply that each

generation should prefer the we ll -being of its successors over itself, so
that consumption always will be deferred. But, as with the no-transfer
and generationa l-balance norms, Cowen's norm encounters the fra ming problem. Although Cowen's frame reasonably encompasses more
than just government fisca l policy, his principle of growth does not
account fo r the intergenerational effects of nongovernment activities
that may complement or offset the intergenerational effects of government policy.
These and si milar attempts to form ul ate a normative account of intergenerational equity for government fiscal policy in particular or
even for government policy as a whole are thus incomplete. It makes
little sense to evaluate whether fiscal policy treats different ge nerations equitably when other aspects of government policy also bear on
the distribution of benefits and burdens across generations; and it
makes little sense to evaluate whether government policy in its entirety treats different generati ons equitably when transfers made
through the decisions of individuals and nongovern ment inst itutions
complement and offset the intergenerational effects of government
pol icy.7J Shaviro was no doubt right, then, to suggest that government
fisca l policy should not be measured against a norm of intergenerational equity.74 He argues that the question of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy cannot meaningfully be separated from the
question of how much saving is appropnate ,7S and, on that point, he
observes that "[t]he most defensible stance " is "skepticism concerning
[d. at 27.
72 Cowen's treatment of this question is equivocal. See id. at 29-31.
?l See also Louis Kaplow, Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: lntergene rational
Distri butive Justice and Efficiency, 74 U. Chi. L Rev. 79, 87-88 (2007) (arguing that "it is
incomple te and potentially misleading to suggest that the present generation does (or docs
not) have an obligation to a future generation to do one specific thing or another, such as
cleaning up the environment, conserving nonrenewable resources, o r avoiding accum ulation of a large debt").
74 Shaviro, note 56. at 180-85. Actually, Shaviro is elusive on this point. Shortl y after
publishing his skeptical a rgument, he suggested in a brief article that "the best course ...
may be to spread the pain [of fiscal sacrificel widely by requiring all age gro ups to share it
in some measure, rather than deeply by making a few pay in full. " Shaviro, Generational
Challen8e, note 60, at 716. More recen tly, hc argued that "it is difficult to specify the
optimal intergenerational distribution policy," but he pointedly declined to dismiss the idea
of intergenerational equity in fiscal policy as not meaningful. Daniel Shaviro, Reckless
Disregard: The Bush Administration"s Policy ofCuHing Taxes in the Face of an Enormous
fiscal Gap, 45 B.C. L. Rev. 1285, 1332 (2(04) [he reinafter Reckless Disregard] . Thus, it is
not quite clear how deep his skepticism on this point runs.
JS Shaviro, note 56, at 168-76.
71
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any strong claims about the proper level of saving."76 To pose the
question of intergenerational equity is necessarily to pose a question
that cannot be answered meaningfully without considering the entire
distribution of benefits and burdens among generations. Framing the
question in a way that excludes nongovernment activity necessarily
yields arbitrary, incomplete, and unreliable outcomes; a norm of intergenerational equity must take account of both government and
nongovernment activity. In other words, intergenerational equity is
not a question specifically for government policy; it is fundamentally a
question of political and moral philosophy.
It might be objected that this criticism sets an unnecessarily high
standard for making normative evaluations about intergenerational
equity. Pushed to the extreme, it suggests that evaluative statements
about intergenerational equity cannot be made unless one can account
for all conceivable transfers between and among generations, which is
plainly not practicable. An alternative position would be to make the
observations that government fiscal policy does have intergenerational effects (as well illustrated by Social Security) and that it may be
possible to determine the direction and rough magnitude of those effects (again as illustrated by Social Security). Those observations imply that, even if we cannot make broad assessments about the
intergenerational equity of government fiscal policy or government
policy as a whole, we can make normative evaluations at the margins
about whether a particular government program or a potential reform
to a particular government program is more or less equitable in its
inlergenerational effects. Thus, for example, even if there is not much
value to labeling the historic intergeneralionai transfers under Social
Security as fair or unfair, there would be considerable value in assessing the intergenerational fairness or unfairness of increasing employment taxes rather than reducing retirement benefits as a mechanism
for addressing Social Security insolvency.
But that is simply another way of begging the question . Although it
may be possible, within limits, to make quantitative judgments about
the intergenerational effects of a particular government program or a
potential reform to a particular government program, it does not follow that the quantitative judgments can support normative conclusions. To conclude that one course of action-such as increasing
Social Security employment taxes-is more intergenerationally equitable than another course of action-such as reducing Social Security
benefits-presupposes a normative evaluation about the status quo.
If the status quo is inequitably skewed in favor of future generations, a
policy that would shift resources from the future to the present (as
76 Id. at 184 (emphasis in original).
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might be the case with an increase in Social Security employment
taxes) would increase intergenerational equity at the margin; but such
a change would decrease intergenerational equity al the margin if the
status quo is inequitable to future generations. Unless one has a
meaningful account of the intergenerational equity or inequity of the
status quo, attaching normative value to Ihe particular intergenerational effects of discrete policies or policy reforms remains little better
than guesswork.
3.

The Frames of Intragellerational Equity

This framing problem is different from-and more complicated
than-the framing problems that arise in the context of assessing intragenerational equity. Superficially, the two sets of framing concerns
seem similar. In both cases, there is an intuitive appeal to assessing
particular government programs or policies. Thus, just as policymakers may want to evaluate whether Social Security equitably distributes
resources across generations, they may want to assess as well whether
Social Security equitably distributes resources within generations (for
example, from wealthier participants to poorer participants). Similarly, closer analysis reveals that , in both cases, the program-specific
frame is too narrow. But the ability to make meaningful normative
evaluations about government policy along the dimension of intragenerational equity and the ability to do so along the dimension of intergenerational equity diverge as the relevant frames widen. The
difference lies in the magnitude and importance of nongovernment
wealth transfers within and across generations. 77
Most intragenerational redistribution in the United States today occurs through government policy. Although individuals and
nongovernment institutions undertake a non-negligible amount of altruistic intragenerational redistribution (for example, through religious and charitable organizations), the primary mechanism for
transferring wealth from the better off to the worse off (or, through
the depravity of politics, from the worse off to the better off) occurs
through government programs and policies. Thus, when evaluating
intragenerational equity, consideration of the distributive effects of
government policy, without regard to the distributive effects of
nongovernment decisions, sets a cogent framework for normative
analysis. By contrast, the intergenerational transfers effected through
individuals and nongovernment institutions are substantial. Reasonable estimates place the amount of wealth transferred across genera71 Particular thanks are due here to Mitchel! Kane for emphasizing the importancc of
this point.
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tions through gifts and bequests at over $400 billion each year,78 with
some estimates expecting cumul ative intergenerati onal tra nsfers to
reach over $40 trillion betwee n 1998 and 20 52.19 Inherited wealth
alone represents as much as 80% of total pri vate assets in the United
States. so A lthough government programs and policies unquestionably
effect intergenerational redistribution- the Social Security program
alone has moved $13 trillion among different generations8t - the size
and salience of nongovernment intergenerational transfers ind icate
that government is not the prim ary vehicle for such redist ribution.
For wh ateve r reason, individuals exhibit substanti ally more altruism
across generations than within generations.82
The impl icati on of this difference between intragenerational transfers and interge nerational transfers is that it is possible to make coge nt normative evaluations about whether government policy,
considered a lone, is intragenerationally fair. Assuming that one can
adequately account for the intragenerationa l distribution of all relevant benefits and burdens of government policy,83 one can sensi bly
determine whether government policy has been fa ir or unfa ir. Even
though nongovernment transfers will have been Ie£[ out of the analysis, those transfers are not so large, relative to the government transfers, as to undermine the reli ability of the assessment. But the
intergenerational context de mands that nongovernment transfers be
taken into account along with the government transfers; indeed, the
nongovernment transfers likely are more important in this context
than the government transfers. As emphasized above, howeve r, a
frame that does not distinguish between the intergenerational effects
of government policy and the intergenerational effects of private decisions does not yie ld normative judgments specific to government pol-

13 Lily Batchelder, Taxing Privilege More Effectively, in the Path 10 Prosperity: Hamilton Projcct Ideas on Income Security, Education and Taxes (Jason Furman & Jason
Bardoff eds., forthcomi ng 2008).
7'J John J. Havens & Paul G. Schervish, Why the $41 Trillion Wealth Transfer Estimate Is
Still Valid: A Review of Challenges and Questions, 7 J. Gift Planning II (2003).
!O Laurence J. Ko tlikorr, Intergenerational Transfers and Savings, 2 J. Econ. Persp. 41,
43 (Spring, 1988); see also William G. Gale & Joh n Ka rl Scholz, Intergeneralional Transfers and the Accumulation of Wealth, 4 1. Econ. Persp. 145, 154-55 (Fall 1994) (arguing
that bequests and inter vivos transfers represen t 63% of private asse ts). Shavi ro also em·
phasizes the substantiality of private intergene rational transfers. See Shaviro, note 56, at
153-54.

See note 38.
As Levinson suggested (in conversation),the increases in standards of living from one
generation to the next reveal significan t intergenerational altruism.
SJ The practical difficult y of that task should not be minimized.
81
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ICY. Any conclusions Ihat the frame yields will be conclusions about

life, not about government. S4
B.

The Inputs Problem

Normative accounts of intergeneralional equity also face a substantial inputs problem. The contrast to normative accounts of intrageneralional equity is very sharp here. In the case of intragenerational
equity , the amount of wealth 1O be distributed and the number and

characteristics of persons among whom that wealth is to be distributed
are given or, in any event, can be treated as given. In the case of
intergenerationa l equity, neither the amount of wealth [0 be distributed across generations nor the number or characteristics of generations are exogenous to the normative questions at issue. Without
fixed inputs, the exercise of determining the normative content of intergenerational equity quickly becomes a conundrum.
Begin with the proposition that questions about the fair di stribution
of wealth require consideration of actual outcomes. Thjs approach
(whjch can be associated with the argument of Liam Murphy and
Thom as Nagel concerning tax equity8S) does not inquire how much
has been transfe rred away from an individual, group, or generation
relative to what the individual, group, or generation had before the
transfer, and it does not inquire how much has been transfe rred to an
individual, group, or generation relative to what the individua l, group,
or generation had before the transfer. Rather, it inquires how much
54 Two examples from the philosophical literatu re illustrate the indeterminacy of intergenerational equity when set within such a broad frame. Ja n Narveson appea ls to "person-regard ing utilitarianism" to establish the existence of obligations to future generations.
Jan Narveson, Future People and Us, in Obligations to FUiure Generations 38-60 (R.I.
Sikora & Brian Barry eds., 1978). Narveson argues that utilitarianism implies that "what
we owe to future gene rations is neither Everything nor Nothing. but merely Something."
Id. at 60. By contrast, Robert Elliot (extending Robert Nozick's work) promises that libertarianism implies "extensive obligations to future generations." Robert Elliot, Fut ure
Generations, Locke's Proviso and Libertarian Justice. 3 J. Applied Phil. 217, 218 (Oct.
1986). Elliot arg ues Ihat Locke's proviso about the acquisition of resources-thai "enough
and as good be left for others"-implies that any individual, "no mailer where the person
is located historically," has a right 10 "how things would have been for him in the state of
nature." Id. at 219, 224. Although this suggests a duty to conserve resources, the duty is
limited 10 those resources tha t would have been available in the stal(: of nature - such as
"clean air. pure water and even aes thetically appealing landscapes.,. Id. at 224·25. But one
would be hard pressed to agree that this constitutes an "extensive" obligation to future
generations. On its face, this duty applies to no pon ion of the siock of human wealth
beyond natu ral resources. It implies, for example, that one generation could consume all
ilS own capital and ailihe capital of the next several generations. As long as the pronigate
generation preserved "clean air, pure water and ... aesthetically appealing landscapes," it
would discharge its intergenerational obligations.
8!1 See Liam Murphy & Thomas Nagel, The Myth of Ownership: Taxes and Justice 3-39
(2002).

2008] INTERGE NERATION AL EQUITY IN FISCAL POLICY REFORM

263

an individual , group, or ge neration has relalive to other individuals,
groups, or generations after all the transfers have been taken into account. On this perspective, intergenerational equity requires equitable outcomes under the sum total of distributions across generations
(much as, on Murphy and Nagel's view, intragenerational equity requires equitable outcomes after taking into account the effects of all
government taxes and transfers).
The inputs difficulty arises because any norm of intergenerational
equity that compares distributional outcomes across generations must
posit the total amount of wealth available for distribution across generations. The total amount of wealth available for distribution across
generations, however, depends on decisions made by each generation ,
and those decisions should depend on the norm of intergenerational
equity (assuming that the norm is at all relevant). Or, to put the same
point in slightly different terms, to the extent that anyone ge neration
follows its norm of intergenerational equity in determining how much
to transfer to its successor generations, the amount of wealth available
for distribution across generations is simultaneously a determinant of
the normative analysis and a product of the normati ve analysis because how much wealth there will be to distribute among all generations depends in part on how that generation defines its obligations to
future generations. A normative account that requires nothing mo re
than passing to the next generation what was received from the prior
generation 86 implies a smaller sum of wealth available for distribution
across all generations than does a normative account that requires
savings for the benefit of future generations. 87
Thi s inputs problem is true not only of the wealth to be distributed
but also of the number of generations and the characteristics of those
86 See Subsection III.B.3 (discussing Ackerman's notion of trusteeShi p).
81 See id. (discussing Rawls' just-saving principle). Consider, fo r example. the point
made by Geoffre y Heal in auempting to establish the proper discount rate for intergenerational effects:
If .. . future generations are richer than the present generation, then wit hi n a
utilitarian framework the value of a marginal unit of consump tion to them will
be less than to us. and this will be reflected in the consumption d iscount
ra te .... If consumpt ion were to be falling rather than rising over time. this
effect would go into reverse and future increme nts of consum ption would be
mo re highly valued tha n present ones. The discount rate could be negati ve.
Geoffrey He al, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U. Chi. L. Re v. 59, 65
(2007). The relative wealth of current and future generations is, of course, the point that a
no rm of intergene rational e qui ty would be meant to resolve. As Douglas Kysar argues:
"(E)very distribution of resources between generations gives rise to a different market
equilibrium, including within that equilibrium a resultant market rate of interest that reflects the opportunity cost of capital"; thus, where (as in environme ntal law) the inqu iry "is
concerned precisely with the ana lytically prior question of reso urce distribution among
generations, it does not make sense to hinge such policymaking on thc existing discount
rate." Douglas A. Kysar, Discounting ... on Stilts, 74 U. Chi. L. Re v. 119, 130-31 (2007).
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generations. Derek Parfi! famously argued that "we ca n easily affect
the id entities of future people" (an element of what he called the
"Non-Identity Problem"). and he observed that this frustrates our
ability to ground "beli efs about our obligations to future gene rations. "88 Although we might pursue actions that would have bad effects for future ge nerations (such as depleting natural resources), the
Non-Identity Problem implies that those actions are "worse fo r no
one" because our actions, in addition to depleting natural resources,
will also change the identities of future people.89 By extension, the
number of future generations, the size of those futur e genera tions,
and the relevant characteristics of those future generations derive in
no small part from decisions made by current genera tions. Just like
the total amount of wealth available across time , the num ber and
identity of genera tions across time cannot be treated as exogenous.
How many fu ture generations the re will be and what those future generations will have depends on what we transfer to them; what we
transfer to them depends on what we believe we ought to transfer to
them; but what we believe we ought to transfer to them depends on
how many of them there will be and what they will have.
Contrast the case of intragenerati onal equity: The re, normative accounts effectively can assume that the relevant question is how the
sum of current wealth should be distributed or redistributed among
existing persons. Although not known with precision, these can be
treated as fixe d. To use a familiar metaphor, the question can be
treated as one of how a pie of a given size will be divided among those
who claim entitlement to a slice. In the case of intergenerational equity, however, neither the quantum of wealth nor the number of th ose
among whom the wealth is to be distributed can be taken as given.90
To continue the metaphor, both the size of the pie and the number of
generations with a claim to it are open questions and , in fact, wi ll be
determined partly by the question of how large each slice should be.
This does not imply that the normative analysis for intergenerational
equity is inescapably circular; it does imply, however, that the normative analysis is very elusive. Approaches and concepts that are Camil88 De re k Pa rfit, Reasons and Persons 377, 451 (1984).
Id. at 361·64.
90 See Peter Laslen & James S. Fishkin, Introduction; Processional Justice, in Justice
Between Age Groups and Generations I (Peler Lasletl & James S. Fishkin cds., 1991)
(arguing that "lP]rinciples of justice, equality, and utility that yield reasonable conclusions
for fixed popu lation sizes over short periodS begin to produce bizarre results once cohort
sizes or total population sizes or both vary over time"'); Cass R. Sunstein & Arden Rowell.
On Discounting Regulatory Benefits: Risk, Money, and intergenerational Equity. 74 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 171, 200 (2007) (discussing the baseline ethical obligations owed by the presen! to the future ror comparison to determi ne any compensatory ac tions that need to be
take n currently).
19
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iar from intragenerational equity break down in the case of
intergeneraliona l equity. Intuitively appeal ing distributional norms,
such as treating everyone the same or equalizing post-distributional
outcomes, falter in the absence of fixed inputs or points of referencewhen we cannot take as given any particular level of wealth or wellbeing of future generations or even the existence of any particular
future ge nerations.

C.

The Coordination Problem

Even if one cou ld set out a normative account of intergenerational
equily that dea lt adequately with the framing problem and the inputs
problem, it still would be necessary to coordinate the requirements of
intergene rational equity with other normative commitments. James
Fishkin makes the very powerful point that credible notions of intergenerationa l equity stand in tension with basic principles of liberal
theory.91 It is not by any means cl ear that the competing normalive
demands can be reconciled .
Consider first the problem of squaring intergenerational equity with
the basic principle of self-determin at ion. Bruce Ackerman at lempts
to merge the two in his nOlion of " trusteeship" in "the tiberal sla te.'>92
Ackerman 's idea of intergenerational equity centers on the argument
that each generation must "arrange its affairs so as to refrain from
making members of the next worse off than the present occupants of
our planet."93 More specificall y, Ackerman argues that, in the liberal
state, each child is "entitled to an endowment that is no worse than ...
that provided to any of his age mates ... [and] that obtained by any
older citizen with whom the younger citizen can converse. "94 In other
words, the "per capita wealth " of each generation must be "equal to"
that of its predecessor generat ion. 95 This implies that each generation
has a duty to preserve and transfer to its successors resources sufficient to satisfy the requirement of equa l endowments among genera-

91 James S. Fishkin. The Limits of Intergenerational Justice, in Justice Between Age
Groups and Generations, note 90, al 62, 71 -13.
92 Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State 223 (1980).
93 Id. at 2 13.
9t Id. at 2 17.
'IS Td. at 223.
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tions.96 This, Ackerman indicates, ensures that those of different
generations enjoy undominated e qua lity.91

Ackerman's articulation of the notion that intergenerational justice
requires equal treatme nt of different generations has considerable appeal; it echoes Fishkin 's observation that " [t]he intuitive idea is th at
justice should be neutral amo ng generational cohortS."98 Still, Ackerman 's requirement of "eq ual endowments" suggests that to tal wealth
like ly would re main stagnant over time. The trusteeship e nvisioned
by Ackerm an merely requires that each generation pass along to the
next generatio n the level of wea lth that it inherited. 99 Thus, any
wealth ge nerated by the activities of a generati on that exceeds the
wealth of the initial endowment may be freely consumed by that generation. If this principle were taken to its limits by each ge neration ,
the endowment that would pass from one generatio n to the next
would be little , if anything, more than what would be found in the
state of nature .] OO
More import antly, Ackerman's trusteeship principle does not effect
the reconci liation of intergenerational equity and " undominated
equality" that he intends. Ackerman specifically argues that intergenerational trusteeship follows from the "plainest ... obligation"
of the first generation to pass along its "inheritance" of undominated
equality; he argues that earli er generations may not exercise the "distinctive form of power" that " temporal priority gives the old ... over
the young."]01 In seeking to safeguard the right of a later generation
to undominated equality, however, Ackerman effectively has forced
upo n the later generation outcomes th at it mayor may not actually
want. Assume, for example, that several generations leave e ndow ~
96 In a similar vein. Fishkin suggests as a possible norm of intergenerational equity "a
requ ire ment of equal per capita sacrifice (over the long te rm ) for generationa l cohorts for
the contributions they are required to make for dependent portions of the population
(whether those pon io ns are for Ihe elderly, the disabled, or the young)." Fishkin. note 9 1,
at 72. Similarly, Kotlikoffs notion of intergenerational equity req ui res the same net tax
rales for every generation. See Section IV.A. Where Ackerman positS Ihe intergeneralional equity norm in terms of equal endowments, Fishkin posits the norm in lerms of
equal sacrifice and Kotlikoff posits the nor m in lerms of equal tax rates. See KOilikoff,
no te 53, at 2 18-19. Each , however, takes Ihe position that just or fair relations between
generations de mand equal treatment of those born inlo different generations.
97 Ackerman, note 92, al 224.
98 Fiskhin, note 91 , al 72. Cf. Dexter Samida & David A. Weisbach, Paretian In le rgenerational Discounting, 74 U. Ch i. L. Rev. 145, 153-54 (2007) (adopting the assumption that "intergeneratio nal equity requires each generation 10 have the same marginal
utility of consumptio n (or absolute utility, depending on our social welfa re function)").
99 Ackerman, note 92, at 224.
100 Ackerman makes clear thai trusteeship does not require a generation to tra nsfer to
its successors any wealth beyond tha t received from its predecessor. Acke rman, note 92, at
224.
101

Id. at 22 1.
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ments to their successors that are greater than the endowments they
inherited; assume, in other words, that the liberal state accumulates
wealth over time. Assume also that , at a point of economic hardship,
one generation, Generation M, which has inherited wealth from previous generations, observes Ackerman's requirement of trusteeship and,
in acting to ensure equal endowments for successor generations,
makes substantial sacrifices to its own well-being. Jf on reaching maturity , the next generation, Generation N, regrets the sacrifices made
by Generation M and expresses a preference that Generation M had
devoted significantly greater resources to its own well-being, Generation N will find that Generation M has in fact exercised its "distinctive
form of power"~not by transferring too few resources to Generation
N but by transferring too many.
Thus, if Congress in 1935 had refused to enact President
Roosevelt's proposal for the Social Security program or if Congress in
1939 and later years had refused to expand the scope of Social Security benefits payable to early program participants, later generations of
Americans might sincerely regret that so mClny of their predecessors
li ved their fina l years in poverty; they might sincerely regret , in other
words, inheriting a society in which government policy passed a
sma ll er program burden forward to later generations but permitted
widespread deprivation among previous generations. Certainly, a response that the earlier generations were acting to preserve the equality of endowment that future generations should have in a ljberal state
would fail to persuade the later generations that the earli er generations had in fact acted properly.
This reflects Fishkin's point about conflict between intergenerational equity and basic principles of liberal theory.l 02 Although
Fishkin 's objective is to demonstrate that the demands of intergenerational equity can constrain the liberties of earlier generations (for example, the liberty of earlier generations to procreate), the constraints
also can apply to the liberties of later generations. First generations
come first, and their actions necessarily affect the world as inherited
by later generations. Ackerman tries to neutralize the "distinctive
form of power" that arises from "temporal priority" by insisting on
equa lity of endowments,103 but he does so by running roughshod over
the prerogative of later generations to make their own determinations
about their own preferences. Only by dictating to later generations
exact ly what it is that they want from a liberal state that gives them
" undominated equality" can Ackerman claim to reconcile intergenerational duties with liberalism.
102 Fishkin, note 91, at 62. 71-73.
!O3 Ackerman, note 92, at 221.
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Next , co nsider the probl em of reconciling the requireme nts of equitable distribution of wealth across generations with equitable distribution of wea lth within generations. The reference poi nt here is John
Rawls, who presents a robust conception of intergeneratio nal obLigations. I04 As applied to ge nerations over time, Rawls's difference principle requires improvement in the "lo ng-term prospects of the least
favored extending over futur e generations. "lOS This implies that
" [e]ach generation must not only preserve the gains of culture and
civilization, and maintain intact those just institutio ns th at have been
established, . .. but it must also put aside in each pe riod of time a
su itable amo unt of real capital accumulation. "I06 This saving must
continue until just instituti ons are established; at that point, no new
intergenerational saving is required, and "a society meets its duty of
justice by maintaining just instit utions and preserving their materi al
base."I07
1n oth er words, for Rawls (unlike for Ackerman), intergenerational
justice req uires actual saving fo r the benefit of future generations.
The specific rate-or, more precisely, rates-of such savings would, of
course, be determined in the original position.lOS Rawls co ntemplates
that the savings rates will be dependent on the state of society at various slagesY)9 Although "the persons in the original position are to
ask themselves how much they would be willing to save at each stage
of advance on the assumption that all o ther generations are to save at
the same ra tes," the poorer (presumably earlier) gene rat io ns will be
savin g at lower rates and the wealthier (presumably late r) generations
101 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 284·93 (1971 ) (he reinafte r Theory of Justice]; see
also Jo hn Rawls, Political Liberalism 274 (1993) (revising his earlier account of intc rgener·
ational juslice).
lOS Ra wls, Theory or Justice, nOte 104, at 285.
10l'i Id.
107 Id. at 287.
1011 Id. Ackennan argues tha t Rawls' own conclusion here-t hai a choice made in Ihe
original position would yield a positive rate of saving-is inconsislent wit h the maximin
approach Ihat ru ns th roughout A Theory of Justice. Specifically. Ackerman argues that
the "j ust savings" principle would necessa ril y lead to lower well-being of thc wors t off in
the earliesl generalions. Acke rman, nOle 92, at 223-25. Ackerman's objection assumes
that any positive ra te of saving as between an early generation and a la te r gene ration must
reduce the we ll-being of every me mber of the early generatio n, including the least well-o(f.
This is by no means necessary, howeve r. A society that observes the progressive redistribution of wealth on a n intragenenllional basis could maintain a steady -or even increasing-level of well-being fo r its least well·off while still making net contr ibutions to capital
accumulation that allow for inlergenerstional transfers eonsistenl with the JUSt savings
principle. It does not necessarily follow, Ihen, that those in (he original position would
ehoose lhe equal-endowment principle of Ackerman's trusteeship over Rawls' just savings
principle.
109 Rawls, Theory of Justice, nOle 104, at 287.
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will be saving at higher rates. II O Still, this just savings principle would
always require a positive rat e of savi ngs because, in Rawls' view, in·
tergenerational transfers can be made only from ea rlier generatio ns to
lat er generations. l l l
But that hardl y seems right. Societies can and do transfer wealth
from later generations to earlier ge nerations-as the United States
has under the Social Security program-by funding payments to earli er generations through the accumulation of debt , whether explicit or
implicit , that must be borne by later ge nerations. 112 To the exte nt that
a society uses such later-to-earlie r interge nerational transfers to im·
prove the position of the least well-off in the earlier generations, it
would seem to act consistently with Rawls' difference princi ple but
contrary to his just savings principle. In short, it is not at all clear why
just savings could not include a negati ve rate of savings in order to
improve intragenerational justice, and it is not at all clear that, under
just savings, concern for the " least favored" must necessarily be
viewed as a "long-term" enterprise. Critica lly, Rawls recogn izes th at
concern for interge nerational justice must be linked to conce rn for
intragenerational justice. He minimizes the conflict between the two,
however, conceding only that the former is a "constraint" on the
latter}1 3
Rawls' efforts to reconcile the just savings principle with th e difference principle underscores the inherent tension between intergenerational equity and intragenerational eq uity. Obviously, a norm of
intergenerational equity must provide mea ningful guid ance on the
balancing of deferred consumption of wealth aga inst current consumption of wealth. The tension there is obvious: Resources that are
consumed today cannot also be saved for the future, and resources
that are set aside for the future cannot also be consumed currently.
But that also implies a fundamental tension betwee n intergenerational
eq uit y and intrage neration al equity. When current genera tions save
or otherwise transfer wealth to future generations, th e current generation s enhance the well-being of future generations. At the same time,
however, current generations limit their own abil ity to contribute to
th e well·being of their own members, includ ing those who are least
110 Id.
111 Id. at 291.

112 If later generations default on debl incurred by earlier generations to fund benefits
for those earlier generations, one or more generations will bear costs from the default. If
the debl is an explicit debt, evidenced ((or example) by government bonds, default will
cause the generations alive at and afler the lime of defaul t, 10 Ihe eXlenllhey are creditors,
10 bear the costs of default and, to the extent they are borrowers, 10 incur higher costs of
borrowing. If the debt is implicit, as it is with Social Security, default will cause the generation or generations thaI are lhe obligees of the implicit debl to bear lhe default.
113 Rawls, Theory of Juslice. note 104, at 292.
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well-off. Thus, intergenerational obligations potentially interfere with
equitable redistribution of wea lth among members of current
generations.
To the exte nt they share OUT no rmalive commitments, members of
future generations benefit from equitable redistribution within current
ge nerations. Thus, if me mbers of current generations were to engage
in no redistribution of wealth in o rder to transfer every available resource forward, future generations may be less well -off simply by virtue of the inequalities in the socie ty they inheri t from current
generations. And yet, resources devoted to redistribution of wealth
among members of current ge nerations canno t be used for redistribution of wealth among membe rs of future ge nerations. This simply fo llows from the trade-off between deferred consumption and current
consumptio n. Eve n if greater intragenerational redistribution by current generatio ns mea ns that future generations inherit a more just society, one cost of that increased redistribution may be greater
intragenerational inequities in the fut ure.
Thus, it is not enough for a substantive norm of intergenerational
equity to balance deferred consumption of wealth against current consumption of wealth ; it also must balance that against the demands of
intragenerat ional eq uity for current gene rations and the demands of
intrage nerational equity for future generations. The goals of preserving resources for our successors and improving the condition of our
contemporaries yield potentially inconsistent directives. But any substantive norm of intergenerational equity th at fails to take account of
how a balance between deferred a nd cu rrent consumptio n furthers or
unde rmines the separate objective of intragenerational equity will be
incomplete.

III.

ANALYTIC PROBL EM S IN MEAS URINC
INT E:RCENERATIONAL EF F ECTS

Notwithstanding the normative problems presented by efforts to
evaluate the intergenera tional eq uity of government fiscal policy, legislators and other policymakers contemplating possible changes to fiscal policy (such as Social Security reform) may want to understand the
inte rge nerational effects of their policy options. 114 This inquirymeasurement of the intergenerational effects of gove rnment fiscal
policy-can be separated from the normative inquiry concerni ng
whether the measured effects are fair. Th at is, one can attempt to
quantify how much wea lth is transferred among past, current , and fu114 See, e.g., U.S. Treasury Dep'l. Social Security Reform: The NalUre of the Proble m
12-13 (2007), available at htlp:llwww.treas.govfpress/releases/reportslposl.pdf.
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ture generations (for example, under the Social Security program)
even if it excludes other relevant aspects of government policy and
nongovernment activity. This Part takes up the problems presented in
trying to measure the intergeneration al effects of government fisca l
policy.
A.

Deficit , Fiscal Gap, and Generational Accounting

In recent years, public finan ce theory has developed quantitative
models for determining the intergeneration al effects of government
fiscal policy; the most prominent are fiscal ga p and generational accounting. These models respond in part to the in adequacies of conventional deficit accounting. Critics argue that the federal budget
deficit does not provide reliabl e informatio n about the actual costs of
government. 115 As a meas ure of cash flow driven in large part by the
labels attached to otherwise similar receipts and payments, Ihese critics see the deficit as inherently manipulable. For example, if the government takes $100 from A in Year 1 and pays $105 to A in Year 2, the
effects on the federal budget deficit for Year 1 and Year 2 differ significantly depending on the labels that the government attaches to the
transactions.11 6 The government could label the $100 receipt in Year 1
as a "tax" and the $105 outlay in Year 2 as a "ben efit ," or it could
label the $100 receipt as "borrowing" and the $105 outlay as a "repayment with interest. " Under the tax-a nd-benefit label , the Year 1
budget deficit is reduced by $100, and the Year 2 deficit is increased
by $105; under the borrowing-a od-repayment label, the Year 1 deficit
is unchanged; the Year 2 deficit is increased by $5. The deficit effects
of the different labels are significant even though the underlying
transaction is economically the same in both cases.ll7
The arbitrariness is more pronounced if the receipt from A and the
o utlay to A are separated by a period longer than the government's
budge t window. 1I8 If the government takes $]00 as a tax from A in
Year 1 and , at the same time, undertakes to pay $265 as a benefit to A
in Year 20, deficit accounting will for many years reflect only a $100
liS Auerbach et aI., note 67, at 56-57; see also Howell E. Jac kson, Accounting fo r Social
Security and Its Reform, 41 Harv. J. Legis. 59 (2004) (arguing "(aJccrua l accounting.
would provide a clearer piclure of the true Slate of the Social Security system's current
financial sho n fall"); KOllikoff. nOle 53, at 18-20.
116 Auerbach et al.. note 67, at 56; Kotlikorr, note 53, at 18.
111 Aue rbach e t al.. note 67. at 57; see KOllikoff, nOte 53, at 19.
118 Alan J. Aue rbach, William G. Gale, Peter R . Orszag & Samara R. Poller, Budget
Blues: The Fiscal Outlook and Options [or Reform, in Agenda for the Nation I \0 (He nry
J. Aa ron, James M. Lindsay & Pietro S. Nivola eds., 2003) (official budget projections use a
ten-yea r window, which does not include all the fiscal effects attributable to baby
boomers.)

272

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:

decrease in the Year 1 deficit because the reported deficit will not
reflect the promise to pay a $265 benefit to A in Year 20 until well into
the future. Of course, if the obligation to pay a $265 benefit in Year
20 were discounted to Year 1 at an appropriate interest rate (here,
5%). the $100 receipt in Year 1 would be offset in full by the $100
present value of the benefit obligation payable in Year 20. In that
case, the transaction would have no effect on the deficit. 1I9
Additionally, deficit accounting fails to identify the intergenerational effects of fiscal policy.120 To see this, assume that the government pays a $100 benefit to A t a retiree, in Year 1 and that A's benefit
is financed by a $100 tax on B, a middle-aged worker , in Year 1. As~
sume also that the government promises to pay B a benefit of $265
once 8 has retired in year 20 and that B's benefit will be financed by a
$265 tax on C in Year 20, when C is middle-aged. Deficit accounting
records no change in the federal budget deficit in Year 1 or in Year 20
attributable to the taxes on 8 and C and the benefits to A and B. In
Year 1, the government's revenue from B's tax exactly matches the
government expenditure on A '5 benefit , and so also with C's tax and
8's benefit in Year 20. 121 Deficit accounting thus not only misses the
deferred benefit obligation incurred by the government; it also misses
the basic point that this policy has made transfers from 8 to A and
from C to B. Because A , B, and C are, by hypothesis, members of
different generations, the fact and extent of the transfers presumably
are important to policymakers. The point would be all the more significant if the benefits paid to the earlier generations (A and B) exceeded the value of the taxes they have paid~precisely the effect, for
example, of Social Security. Under deficit accounting, however, that
redistribution fails even to register as an element of fiscal policy.
In response to these and other shortcomings of deficit accounting,
public finance economists have developed other measures of government fiscal policy-most notably, fiscal gap accounting and generational accounting. Both fiscal gap and generational accounting begin
with the government's intertemporal budget constraint-the premise
that, ultimately, aggregate government spending cannot exceed the
sum of net government assets and aggregate government revenues;122
119 See Kotlikofr, nOle 53, at 143-49; David M. Cutler, Book Review of Generational
Accounting, 46 Nat'l Tax J. 61, 62-63 (1993).
110 Auerbach et al., nOle 67, al 56-57; Shaviro, Reckless Disregard, note 74, at 1290; see
also Congressional Budget Office, Who Pays and When? An Assessment of Generational
Accounting 2-3 (1995), available at hllp:lfwww.cbo.gov/ftpdocslOxxldocl81Genattl.pdf.
121 See generally Auerbach et al., note 67, at 57.
122 Alan J. Auerbach & Laurence J. Kotlikoff, The Methodology of Generational Accounting, in Generational Attounting Around the World 31 (Alan J. Auerbach, Laurence
J. Kotlikoff & Willi Leibfritz eds., 1999); Jagadeesh Gokhale & Kent Smelters. Fiscal and
Generational Imbalances: New Budget Measures for New Budgel Priorities 7 (2003) (stat-

2008] INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN FI SCAL POLICY REFO RM

273

and both fisca l gap and generational accounting posit , counterfactually, the indefinite continuation of current fiscal policy.123 Fiscal gap
accounting adds th e present value of projected government receipts to
the current value of government assets and subtracts that sum from
the present value of projected government spending.l24 In contrast to
deficit accounting, which measures the government's annual cash
flow, fiscal gap accounting measures the unfunded cost of future government spending. Thus, the " fiscal gap" is the amount, expressed as
a present value, that government would have to add to its existing
assets and its future revenues to pay in full for its projected spending if
curre nt fiscal policy were to remain unchanged. 125 Recent calculations put the fiscal gap at somewhere between $44 trillion and $85.5
trillion. 126 The fiscal gap for the Social Security program alone has
been estimated at $7 trillion. m
The fiscal gap includes revenues and expenditures attributable to
current, past, and future generations.128 By subtracting from government spending attributable to current and past generations the sum of
future government reve nues attributable to those generations and the
value of current government assets, one can determine how much of
the unfunded cost of government is shifted from current and past generations to future generations. 129 Recent calculations put this net cost
imposed on future generations just for Social Security at approximately $8.8 trillion. DO
ing that the government's "current (net) dcbt held by the public plus lhe government's
future non·interest spending must be balanced over time by its fUlUre receipts").
123 See Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J . Kotlikoff, Using Ge nerational Accounting to Assess Fiscal Sustainability and Generational Equity, in Distri butional Analysis of Tax Policy 183-84 (David F. Bradfo rd ed., 1995); Gok hale & Smellers,
note 122, a t 7-9.
124 Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, at 8.
IlS Id. at 3. Alternatively, some defi ne the fi scal gap as the prescnt value of the amount
needed to preve nt the ratio of government debt to gross domes tic product from increasing
ovcr a specified measuring period. See. e.g., Auerbach e t a I., note 11 8, at 123; U.s. Gov't
Accountability Office, The Nation's Long-Term Fisca l Out look 5 (2006), available at hnp:1I
www.gao.gov/new.itc msld061077r.pdf.
126 See Go khale & Smellers, note 122, at 2, 25-27 (calculating the fiscal gap at $44.2
trillion as of 2002); U.S. Gov' t Accountability Office, note 125, at 5 (calculating the fisca l
gap, under a "realistic si mu la t ion ,~ at $6 1 trillion as of 2006); Daniel N. Shaviro, Taxes,
Spending, and the U.S. Government's March Toward Bankruptcy 43 (2007) (indicating
fiscal gap as high as $85.5 trillion).
127 Gokhale & Smellers. no te 122, at 25·28 (calculated as of 2002).
128 Id. at 8.
129 Id. at II.
130 Id. at 25-28 (calculatcd as of 2002). This $8.8 trillion value is higher than the overall
fiscal ga p of $7 trillion for the Social Security program because future generations are
projectcd to pay into the program an amount tha t exceeds what they receive from the
program by about $1.7 trillion. Id. at 28.
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Generational accounting provides a second method for measuring
how fiscal policy distributes th e costs of gove rnment among different
generations. The government adopted it briefly in the early 1990's as
a supplement to deficit accounting,1 3] and it has been used by multil ateral development agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 132 Generational accounting first separates
current and past generations into birth cohorts up through children
born in the year of the calculation. o 3 It then determines the lifetime
net taxes paid and expected to be paid by each birth cohort on the
assumption that current fiscal policy continues indefinitely.l3 4 For this
purpose, " net taxes" comprise income taxes, payroll taxes, property
taxes, and excise taxes paid to federal , state , and local governments
less government transfer payments made in cash and certain cash
equivalents (such as Social Security benefits, Medicare and Medicaid
benefits, food stamps, and unemployment insurance).135 These lifetime net taxes are expressed, relative to lifetime income , as a net tax
rate. Then , proceeding from the premise of the government 's intertemporal budget constraint, generational accounting allocates to all
future generations the costs of government not paid for by current and
past generations. 136 This total residual cost of government also is expressed as a lifetime net tax rate for future generations. 137
In short, generational accounting shows both how fiscal policy has
treated past generations relative to curre nt generations and how the
continuation or modification of current fiscal policy would treat future
generations rel ative to the youngest members of current generations.
Rece nt calculations put the lifetime net tax rate of newborns at 22.8%
and the lifetime net tax rate of future generations at 32.3%.13& In th e
language of ge nerational accounting, this revea ls a "generational im III Office of Manage ment and Budget, Budget of the Un ited Statcs Government, Fisca l
Year 1995: A nalytical Pe rspectives 21-31 (1994); Office of Management a nd Budget,
Budget Baselines, Historical Data, and Alternatives for the Future 53 1-40 app. One(F)
(1993); Office of Manage ment a nd Budget, Budget of the United States Government, fiscal Year 1993, at 3-7 to 3-13 (1992).
132 Auerbach & KOilikoff, note 122, a t I.
III Laurence J. Kot li koff, Ge nerational Policy 53 (2003); Auerbach et al., note 67, at 59-

60.
134 Kotlikoff, no te 133, at 53.
m Auerbach et al., no te 67, al 59; Congressional Budget O[fice, note 120, at 9.
136 Auerbach & KotlikoU, note 122, at 33. Ge nerational acco unti ng generall y assu mes
that the residual unfunded cost of government is allocated equally across all future generatio ns (after allowing for an adjustment for "real productivity growth"). Auerbach et aI.,
note 67, at 6 1-62.
lJ1 Auerbach & Kotlikoff, note 122, al 33.
138 K.otlikoff, no te 133, a t 67. These calculatio ns do nOI lake into account legislation
e nac ted since 2000. Id. at 67-68.
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balance" in gove rnment fiscal policy.\39 Specific appl ication of generati onal accounting to Social Security demonstrates that the program
imposes a net tax on participants born between World War II and the
end of the 20th century. l40 For these participants, total empl oyment
taxes paid into the program exceed total benefit s payable from the
program by approximately 5% of lifetime earnings. 141 This net fiscal
burden is conside rable: It re presents roughly one-sixth to one-seventh
of the lifetime net tax rate for these participants when calcul ated for
all aspects of government fiscal policy.142 Similarly, ge nerational accounting indicates that many legislative reforms aimed at Social Security solve ncy generally would increase lifetime fiscal burdens both
for future generations and for younger members of current
generations. 143
B.

Limitations of Fiscal Gap a nd Generatum al Accounting

Both fisca l gap and generational accounting constitute improvements over deficit account ing in understanding the inte rgenerational
effects of government fiscal policy. Their strength lies in their capacity to project current policy forward and determine, within the parameters of their assumptions, which generations have borne or will bea r
many of the cash costs of gove rnment. That, in turn , tells us whether
!he costs that will be borne by future genera tions are managea ble in
light of their anticipated incomes and , relatedly, whether the cash-flow
im plications of current fisca l policy will like ly be sustain able over the
long term . Fiscal gap and generational accounting thus predict
whether-and, in rough terms, when-we will have to modify fiscal
policy to meet the cash needs of the fede ral government.
The architects of fisca l gap and gene rational accounting argue that
these measures therefore should replace deficit accounting as th e preferred stand ard for assessing fiscal policy.1 44 More pointedly, they argue th at government fisca l policy should ignore the federal budget
deficit and instead should aim to achieve both "fisca l balance"-th e
139 Id. at 58-59; Jagadeesh Gok hale, Benjamin R. Page & John R_ Sturrock, Generational Acco unts for the Un ited Stales: An Upda te, in Ge nerational Accounling Around
the World, nOle 122, at 491, 498.
J411 Caldwell el aI., note 44 , al 130-34.
J4J Id. at 130.
142 Auerbach el aI., nOle 123, at 200 (showing lifelime nel lax rales for post-War
generalions).
143 Caldwell el al., nOlc 44, al 134-39; Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadees h Go khale & La ure nce
J. KOilikoff, Social Securit y and Medicare Policy from Ihe Perspective of Generational Accounling 9 (NBER Working Paper No. 3915, 199 1), available at htlp:llwww.nbcr.o rglpaperslw39I S.pdr?new _wi ndow: 1.
144 Gokhale & Smellers, note 122, al 1-2; Kotlikoff, nOie 53, at 217-18.
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elimination of any fi scal gap-and "generational balance"-the elimination of any shift in the cost of government fro m current generations
to future generations,, 45 Th is proposed redefinition of the end of fiscal policy can be set fo rth in a weak version or a strong versio n. The
weak versio n is predicti ve. It argues th at, given the stubbo rn fact of
the gove rnment 's interte mporal budget constraint , the existence of a
fisca l or generational imbalance demonstrates that current fiscal po licy is unsustainable and th at government cannot avoid changing its
fi scal poli cy in some manner at some poin t. 146 The weak version
predicts that government policy will change, but it does not predict
when or how it will change. The strong versio n, by contrast, is no rmative. It argues not o nly that government fiscal policy will change but
th at it sho uld change because of the otherwise in equitable outcomes
for future generatio ns. 147 Quite apart from the notion that changing
those outcomes is in evitable, the strong version argues that changing
those outcomes is right.
The strong version of the claim , however, is mi splaced. Altho ugh
they provide interesting analytic in for mation, fisca l gap and generational accounting do no t move us close r to answering the question
whether current fiscal policy or any specific reform to current fiscal
po licy is fair to curre nt and future generatio ns. First, neither fiscal gap
nor generational accounting addresses t he normative problems, discussed in Pa rt II, that any account of intergene rational equity must
address. For exa mple, both restrict their analysis to the frame of government fisca l policy and the reby ignore all other intergenerational
transfe rs made through o the r aspects of government policy and
through nongovernment activities.
Second , both fiscal gap and ge nerational accoun ting treat the benefits and burdens of government fiscal policy asymmetrically. Proponents and critics have no ted th at these measures do not account fo r all
the benefits of government spending, including government spending
to pu rchase goods and services and government spending that results
in public goods. us In o the r words, many of the benefits prod uced by
14~ Gok hale & Smelle rs, note 122, at 2; Kotlikoff, note 53, at 218·19.
146 Gokhale & Smetters, nOle 122, at 2; Kot likoff, note 133, at 67·69; Gok hale el al., note
139, at 490.
147 Kotlikoff, note 53, a t 219·20; Ala n J. Aue rbach , Jagadeesh Gokhale & Laurence J.
Kotlikoff, Ge ne ra tional Acco unti ng: A Meaningfu l Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy, 8 J.
Econ. Persp. 73, 82. 84·85 (Win te r, 1994). But see Laurence 1. KOI likoff, Re ply to Diamond's and CUller's Reviews of Ge nerational Accou mi ng, 50 Na t'l Tax J. 303, 308 (1 997)
("[NJeither J nor my colleagues have suggested that generational ba lance is a sine qua non
for generational equi ty. ").
148 Neil H, Buchanan, Social Securil Y, Ge nerational1ustiee, and Long-Te rm Deficils, 58
Tax L. Rev. 275,311· 12 (2005); Willem H. Buiter, Gellerational Accounts, Aggregate Sav·
ing and Inte rgenerational Distribution, 64 Economica 605, 606 (1997); Gokhale & Smet-
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fiscal policy are not attributed by fiscal gap or generational accounting
to any generation-past, present, or future. Thus, the benefits of political libert ies and civil rights, national defense against fore ign enemies, a functionin g system of justice, maintaining constitutional order,
and many similar goods provided by government are simply disregarded in comparing the intergenerat ional distribution of fiscal policy
benefi ts and burdens. 149 This treatment is inconsistent with the treatment of the cost of government spending to produce those benefits:
Both fiscal gap and generational accounting attribute the burden of
providin g these benefits to those paying the taxes that finan ce them,
but the benefits are attributed to no one.
Fiscal gap and generational accounting do not account for these
benefits because they cannot account for them.lso Any att empt to determine the value of these benefits would be arbitrary. One might
consider using the cost to government of providing the benefits as a
first approximation for value, but that met hod would produce striking
anomalies. As Peter Diamond argues, it is important to distinguiSh
distributional calculations based on costs and distributional ca lculations based on utilitjes. 151 There is little reason to suppose, for example, that individuals value freedom from foreign invasion exactly at
the amount spent by government on national defense. 152 Assuming
that the value of such benefits could be determined , actual attribution
of that value to specific generations would be arbitrary. David Cutler
points out that we have no idea how much one particular generation
ters, note 122, ~t 13; Robert Haveman, Should Generational Accounts Replace Public
Budgets and Oericits? 8 J. Econ. Persp. 95, 97. 100-01 (Winter. 1994); Shaviro, note 56, at
131; KotlikoU. note 53, at 168. But see Gokhale et al., nOte 139, at 498-501 (attempting
generational attribution of some, but nOt all, government purchases). Shaviro, note 126. at
38-39 (a rguing that "generational accounting treats taxes and transfers symmetrically").
149 See, e.g., Auerbach et al .. note 67, al 87-92.
ISO Cutler, note 119. at 66: Gokhale & Smelters. note 122, al 13; Kotlikoff, note 133, at
55; see also Auerbach & KotJikoff. note 122, at 32 ("With the exception of government
expenditures on health care and education, which are treated as transfer payments, (generational] accounts do nol impute to particular generations the val ue of the government's
purchases of goods and services because it is difficult to attri bute the benefitS of such
purchases:'); Congressional Budget Office, note 120, at 45 ("Trying to assign the benefitS
of mOSI (government] purchases to specific generations ... is impracticable."). Buiter
notes that "(c]onccptually. the re is no special problem in valuing public consumption " but
that "Iiln practice, of course, the quantification of welfare consequences of public con·
sum ption is likely to be an extremely complicated job." Buiter, note 148, at 616.
131 Peter Diamond, Generational Accounts and Gcnerational Bala nce: An Assessment,
49 Nat 'l Tax J. 597, 599 (1996) (explaining that the "difference between the cost and utility
approaches~ depends on "how people valued the expenditures" so that " the sum of utilities from the expenditures might be larger or smaller than the aggregate level of
expenditures").
IS2 Id. at 605 (giving an example regarding the interstate highway system; however, the
point is applicable across a broad range of government purchases).
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benefits from national defense relative to any other particular generation, even if one faces greater threats to its security than the other. 153
The asymmetry presents a much more significant limitation on fiscal
gap and generational accounting as reference points for intergenerational equity than either proponents or critics have recognized. The
failure to account for these benefits not only affects the analysis of the
government spending that is obviously devoted to the provision of
public goods, such as national defense;IS4 it also undermines the analysis of government transfer programs~programs supposedly at the
core of fiscal gap and generational accounting. Government transfer
payments for Social Security, Medicare, and food stamps provide
more than just cash and cash equivalents to the recipients and their
family members. They also provide public goods more broadly. Past,
current , and future generations derive a substantial benefit of the public-good variety from living in a society that limits poverty among the
elderly through the Social Security and Medicare programs. Similarly,
members of past, current, and future generations who never have seen
and never will see a food stamp or a welfare payment realize a benefit
from government programs intended to prevent children from starving in the streets.
These and similar noncash benefits attributable to government fiscal policy are genuine and substantial. They provide individuals who
receive no government transfer payments with returns on the taxes
that they pay to the government. Such benefits also legitimize political decisions made by individuals as to how great a tax burden they
are willing to accept. But fiscal gap and generational accounting treat
all these public-good benefits, which simply cannot be collapsed into
the cash transfer payments that facilitate them, as though they were
provided entirely to the individuals who receive the transfer payments
or to no one at all. In other words, even though the project of fiscal
gap and generational accounting is to determine how the benefits and
burdens of government fiscal policy are distributed across different
generations, fiscal gap and generational accounting do not account
properly for many of the most important benefits that justify those
burdens.
Failing to account fully for the benefits of government fiscal policy
and to attribute those benefits to the appropriate generations critically
undermines our ability to judge whether government fiscal policy, as
measured by fiscal gap and generational accounting, is fair to different
m Cutler, note t19, at 66.
I~ See, e.g., Staff Paper Prepared for the Presidenl's Commission to Study Capital
Budgeting, Generational Accounting (Apr. 21 , 1998), available at htlp:lfc1inton3.nara.govl
pcscb/staCgenacc.html; Diamond, note lSI , at 605.
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ge nerations. Any meaningful norm of intergeneratio nal equity, at a
minimum, must account for both burdens and benefits. Consider the
absurd results implied by the contrary position, that is, the possibility
that we undertake no rmati ve judgments about inte rgenerational equity by considering o nly burdens but no t benefits. Assume, fo r this
limited purpose, that there was a broad agreement that trea ting different generations equitably required treating each separate ge neration
the same .- 55 Now posit a new program under which the government
imposes a tax on members of Generation A (many of whom are parents of young children) in order to provide uni versal pre-school care
to all members of Generation B (all of who m are young children) . A
normati ve evaluatio n of this program th at considered only th e imposition of burdens would find the policy unfair to Generation A. But the
emptiness of that conclusion becomes readily apparent when we ackn owledge that the beneficiaries of the policy are the members of
Generation A who are th emselves parents of young childre n. The program may present questio ns of equity within a single generatio n beca use it redistrib utes wea lth fro m members of Generation A who are
not parents of young children to members of Generation A who a re
parents of young children. But to label the program unfair or inequitabl e across generations is to miss the mark by quite a wide margin.
Indeed, pushed toward its limits, the propositio n that the in tergeneratio nal equity of fisca l po licy can be evaluated without accounting full y for the benefits of that policy would lead to conclusions
that we generall y would reject outright. Consider, fo r example, the
case of a government th at imposes large fisca l burdens o n future generations by borrowing heavil y to fin ance nation al defense against an
impending fo reign invasion.l56 If the intergenerational equity of government fiscal po licy were appropriately evaluated, as a normative
matter, by considering onl y the burde ns imposed o n different generatio ns, o ne might think the government's decision to borrow excessively during time of war to be intergenerationally inequitable . But
that conclusio n rightl y strikes o ne as absurd and dangero usly wrong.
Few could agree that a government policy of devoting all available
resources of present and future generati ons to preserve the nation's
security against an invading enemy is unfair to th e future generatio ns
wh o otherwise would be born into a state of occupation. Yet that is
precisely the implication of making normative judgments about how
the costs of fin ancing national defense are distributed among current
This assu mption is made solely for convenience of presenla tion.
See, e.g., Congressional Budget Office, note 120, at 25, 45. Consider, for example,
the deb ts incurred by Great Britain during World War II. See, e.g., Sean Glynn & Alan
Booth, Modern Bri tain: An Economic and Social History 154-55 (1996).
15$
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and future generations, without also accounting for how the benefits
of that spending are distributed.
This shortcoming prevents fiscal gap and generational accounting
from serving as a basis for normative judgments about the past or future intergenerational effects both of government fiscal policy generally and of specific tax-aDd-transfer programs. As shown in Part II,

the Social Security program has redistributed approximately $13 trillion in cash from program participants born after 1937 to program
participants born before 1938. 157 But any effort to make normative
assessments about the intergenerational equity of the program breaks
down once we recognize that these numbers fail to account fully for
the program's benefits. We can label the participants born after 1937
as net losers under the program based on the $13 Irillion transfer, but
we cannol know whether we should still regard them as net losers if
the noncash benefits that they receive from Social Security were taken
into account. Most of those born after 1937 derive a genuine benefit
from the existence of a government program thai provides cash support to the elderly and disabled, and many would be willing to pay
taxes into the program even if they understood that they will receive
less than they contribute. Certainly the analyses of fiscal gap and
generational accounting reveal useful and interesting information
about Social Security, but they do not provide us enough information
about its intergenerational effects to make normative judgments. I SS
C.

Additional Problems with Fiscal Gap and
Generational Accounting

Fiscal gap and generational accounting also present other difficulties. Both rely on projections not only of future government behavior
but also of future economic conditions, and those projections will
likely prove incorrect. Both treat all future generations as an undifferentiated group-so that those born next year are not distinguished
from those born many years in the future. Both make assumptions
about how tbe benefits and burdens of government policy should be
attributed to current and future generations. IS9
1 ~7

See note 38.
These objections are also generally relevant to aUempts to measure the intragenerational equity of governme nt fiscal policy. See Murphy & Nagel, note 85, at 3-39; see also
Michael J. Grae tz, Legal Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision,
126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 47, 81 ·82 n.l06 (1971) ("ll)t is impossible to evaluate income tax
changes in tenns of vertical equity without looking at the overall effects of governmental
action on the distribution of income.").
159 Except for the nondifferentiation pOint, these problems are generally familiar from
evaluating the innageneralional effects of government fiscal policy. See generally, Graetz,
note 61.
1511
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Uncertainty of Assumptions

As critics of fiscal gap and generational accou nti ng have noted, any
effort 10 quantify the intergene rat iona l effects of current or reformed
fiscal policy necessarily requires assumpt ions about future cond itions- including economic growth, interest rates, risk premia, population growth , mortality rates, incomes, and the costs of specific goods
and se rvices relat ive to those of other specific goods and services. l60
For exampl e, ca lculating the fiscal gap attributa ble to Social Security
depends critica lly on assumptions about a wide array of economic
data, and va riations in those data can alter the analysis significan tly.
Assumptions, of cou rse, can prove right or wrong.
The possibility of error in the assumptions needed to calcu late the
fisca l gap and generational accounts is much more significant than it is
for deficit accounting because of th e longe r time frame. Deficit accounting typically looks forward over a five- or ten-yea r period, while
fiscal gap and generational accou nting typically look forward over a
seventy-five-yea r period or eve n the in finite future. The longer horizon makes assumptions about future economic conditions inherently
more specu lative. For exa mpl e, determining the size of the unfunded
liability for Medicare benefits over a seventy-five-yea r period requires
assumptions about the cost of hea lth care over the next 75 years. The
longer horizon also magnifies the effect of erroneous assumptions:
The present va lue of an obliga tion to pay a $10,000 Social Security
benefit seventy-five years from now is just under $1100 if discounted
at an interest rate of 3%, but the present value of that same obligation
is just over $525 if discounted at 4%.
Still , the problem of uncertain assumptions does not undermine the
central project of fiscal gap and generational accounting. Any attempt
to quantify the future effects of government fisca l policy necessarily
makes assumptions about future states of the world; the question is
not whether the assumptions ultimately prove correct but whether
they incorporate the best ava ilable information and follow appropriate methodologies. ]6 1 Although the uncertainty of the assumptions
suggests a co rresponding uncert ainty of the results, it does not imply
that Ihe results are meaningless.
160 Dean Baker. Robbing Ihe Cradle? A Critical Assessment of Generational Accounting 16-19 (1995); Buchanan. no]e 148. at3 13· 14; Congressional Budget Office, note 120, al
29-32; Diamond, note lSI , at 602-03; Goode & Steuerle, no]e 56, a] 1030-31; Haveman,
note 148, at 101-04.
161 Scnsitivi]y analyses generally indicate that varying the relevant assumptions wi thin
reasonable parame]ers alters ]he magnitude, but not the existence, or fiscal gap and genera]ional imbalances. Gok hale & Smellers, nOle 122, al 35-4t ; Kotlikof(, note 133, at 67.
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Nondifferentiation of Future Gellerations

Both fiscal gap and generational acco unting begin with the government 's intertemporal budget constraint and calculate as a residuum
the unpaid cost of government that will be borne by all future generations. Thus, both measures determine a net cost imposed on future
generations as a whole rather than on particular future generatio ns
separately. Fiscal gap accounting simply measures the total unfunded
cost of government as a single oet burden for the future. Although
generational accounting does measure lifetime tax rates for members
of current and past generations, it does not make a similar measurement , for example, with respect to the cohort born te n yea rs from now
or 100 years from now. 162 Therefore , as both critics and defenders of
fiscal gap and ge nerational accounting have noted, these measures tell
us how government fisca l policy has treated separate generations up
through the one born today, but they do not tell us how government
fiscal policy will treat any specific future generation relative to any
other specifi c future generation or relative to any specific curre nt or
past generation. ]63
3.

/rtcidence of Fiscal Benefits and Burdens

Even where fiscal gap and generational accounting do make distinc~
tions among generations, there are reasons to questio n how they attri~
bute the benefits and burdens of fiscal policy. Perhaps of necessity,
these measures make simplifying assumptions about the incidence of
taxation. For example, individual income taxes genera lly are considered to be borne by the individual paying the tax, and taxes on capital
income generally are attributed to the owners of capital. ]64
No less importantly, both fiscal gap and ge nerational accounting
flatly assume that there is no "sliding" of government benefits among
family members. 16 S When government makes a transfer payment to
an individual, fiscal gap and generational accounting treat the nominal
162 Gokhalc ct aL, note 139, a] 493-98.
163 Diamond, note lSI , at 603-04; Gokhale & Smellers. note 122, at 11; Haveman. note
148, al 97, 100; Kotlikoff, no]e 133, al 55-56.
164 Auerbach & Kotlikoff, note 122, a t 34; Congressio nal Budget Office. note 7, a] 37-38;
Haveman, note 148, al 98-99, 104-06; Kotlikoff. note 133, a t 60. The proponents of generational accounting concede thai, although it "atte mpts to understa nd the gene rationa l incidence
.. of fiscal policy changcs," the measu re "incorporates a set of incidence
assump]ions thaI will nOI, in general, capture the fu ll range of either microeconomic or
mac roeconomic responses to policy changes" and "should be viewed as a mcthod of approximating the policy-induced welfare changes experienced by diffe re nt generations."
Generational Accounting Around the World, no te 122, al 4.
16!i Gokhale & Smelters, nOle 122, a t 11 , 53-54; KO\likoff, notc 133, al 61 : Congressional
Budge t Office, note 120. at 37-38; Haveman, note 148, a t 104-06; Office of Managemenl
and Budget, note 131 . at 23.
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recipient of the payment as the only beneficiary. This effectively assumes, for example, that the adult children of Social Security recipients derive no economic benefit from the fact that their elderly
parents receive income support from the government and that parents
of young children derive no economic benefit from Ihe fact Ihat their
children receive publicly financed education.
To appreciate the problems this causes, assume that the government
introduced a program to pay full post-secondary education costs for
anyone under the age of twenty-five. In the absence of this program,
many parents of individuals under the age of twenty-five pay for all or
part of those costs; this implies that , at least initially, parents would
capture part or all of the benefits of the program. But fiscal gap and
generational accounting would consider individuals under the age of
twenty-five to be the sole recipients of the program benefits- resulting in a miscalculation of the generational effects of the program. Assume further that, over time, some families respond to the ex.istence of
the program by increasing their support of older family members.
Thus, because Mother no longer pays the college costs of Son, she
increases the amounts she pays to support Grandmother. At this
point, part of the cost of repealing the program would be borne by
Mother and part by Grandmother, but fiscal gap and generational accounting would show the full burden of repea l as falling on Son. l 66
The assumption that the benefits of the program do not slide between
family members can result in misattribution.
The architects of fiscal gap and generational accounting defend the
assumption that benefits do not slide by attacking the position-generally referred to as "Ricardian equivalence"-that individual saving
and dissaving respond directly to changes in government fiscal policy
and, in fact , offset the effects of government fiscal policy.167 Even if
full Ricardian equivalence is implausible, it does not follow that there
is no sliding at all.]68 Plainly, many adults would take their elderly
166 Of course, if Mother responded to the progrilm simpl y by increasing her bequest to
Son by iln ilmOunt equal to what she otherwise would hilvc pilid for his post-secondary
ed uca tion, Son would capture the full benefit of the program and would bear the full cost
of its repeal.
161 See Robert 1. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. Pol. Econ. 1095,
1116 (NovemberlDeeember. 1974); sec also Leimer I, note 32, at 43-44: Shaviro, Reckless
Disregard, nOIe 74, at 1288.
168 Sce Robert 1. Lampman & Timothy M. Smeeding, Interfa mily Transfers as Alternatives to Government Transfe rs to Persons, 29 Rev. of Income & Wcalth 45, 47-54 (1983),
available at http://www.roiw.org/1983/45.pdf;see also Jane G. Gravelle, Methodological lssues of Generational Accounting, in Distributional Analysis of Tax Policy 208 (David F.
Bradford ed., 1995) ("Truth presumably lies somewhere between no transfers and Ricardian equivalence."). But see Li Gan, Guan Gong & Michael Hurd, Net Inte rgenerational
Transfers fro m an Increase in Social Security Benefits (The Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard C.
Working Paper No. 482, 2006), available at hnp:!lwww.levy.orglpubslwp_482.pdf.
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parents into their homes or otherwise provide for them in the absence
of government-provided support such as Social Security and Medicare , and , plainly , many parents of young children would finance their
children's education in the absence of publicly financed education,I69
To attribute every dollar of every government transfer payment only
to the nominal recipient of that payment is to ignore the important
relationships existing among famil y members of different generations
that imply commitments of suppo rt. Fiscal gap and generational accounting improperly assume a false dichotomy: Either there must be
full Ricardian equivalence, or there is no intergenerational sliding at
all. To the extent that fiscal policy benefits slide in part, the actual
incide nce of those benefits is more nuanced and obscure than fiscal
gap and generational accounting assume.
IV.

POLITIC AL ApPROAClll';S TO I N'I'ERGENERATIONA L EQUITY

Th e skeptical case developed thus far offers little to policymakers
whose responsibilities include decisions that have intergenera tional effects. Consider the question of Social Security reform. A conscientious lawmaker may regard the long-term insolvency of the program
to be a pressing policy matter; she may understand th at the program
has redistributed substantial wea lth from current and future generations to past generations; and she may express concern that any reform aimed at restoring long-term solvency not place inequitable
burdens on future generations. But the discussion in Parts II and III
above provides no real guidance 10 this conscientio us lawmaker. To
advise her that there is no sound method for measuring all the relevant intergenerational effects of the program or any program reform
and that, even if there were a way of measuring those effects, there is
no meaningful normative framework for evaluating them is to imply
that she might as well ignore concerns about intergenerational equity
entirely. Before concluding that questions of int ergenerational equity
cannot be add ressed within fiscal policy reform , however, it is necessary to consider whether those questions might be resolved satisfacto169 Steuerle and 8akija argue that Social Securit y benefits "may . . be viewed as replacing transfers that workers would have made otherwise to their retired pare nts" and that,
correspondingly, "ltJhe smaller li fetime private transfers these workers receive from their
children might be viewed as an offset to large public transfers give n to them." Steuerle &
Bakija, note 7, at 131 n.32; see also Congressio nal Budget Office, note 120, at 39 (discussing uncertainties regarding " how or how much transfers slide"); Ache nbaum, note 4, at S3
(describing benefits conferred on children of earliest program participants through relief
from family support obligations). As Have ma n puts it: "On what basis can one presume
that health care benefits-or retire ment pensions-assigned to the e lderly represent net
benefits to them, as opposed to their adul t child ren on whom the burden could have fallen
were not the public program in place?" Have man, no te 148, at 105.
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rily through political processes. There is reason for guarded optimi sm
here, including the fact that politics serves as the vehicle for resolving
other difficult normative questions presented by government pOlicy.
A.

Politics as a Proxy for Substantive Eqllity

Arguably, we can pursue intergenerationa l equity in fiscal policy reform even if we cannot adequately measure intergenerational effects
and even if we lack a normative framework fo r evaluating those effects. Co nsider, for comparati ve purposes, how we address questions
of intragenerational equity in fiscal policy. Public fin ance theory does
not provide perfect measures of how governme nt fiscal policy transfers resources among different groups of current generations;l70 and,
certainly, there are sharply different views about what constitutes a
just, equi table, or fair distribution of wea lth among those groups. Few
would argue, however, that govern ment cannot or should not pursue
intragenerational equity through its fiscal policy. Our political discourse generally recognizes as relevant and meaningful the claims
made about the desirability or undesirability of government redistribution through tax and transfer programs; we consider it reasonable
and well within the bounds of normal political debate to argue that
fairness and equi ty demand more or less redistribution than current
government policy effects.
Importantly, ou r notions of intragenerational equity do not have a
formal role in govern ment policymaking. Although we may praise or
criticize particu lar government policies from the standpoint of intragenerational equity, no specific measure of intragenerational distributional effects is considered controlling, and no specific normative
fr amework of intrage nerational eq uity has anything approaching official status. In ot her words, the intragenerational equity or inequity of
a particular policy decision does not provide a basis for the legal validation or invalidation of the policy decision. One individual may believe strongly that the intragenerational distribut ive effects of a
particular policy are fundamenta lly unjust , and another individual
may strongly believe otherwise. They have a basis for reasoned disagreemen t, but neither can invoke any forma l mechanism of the legislative or judicial process to overturn or confirm the policy decision on
the ground that it reaches an intrage nerationally inequ it able or eq uitable result.
The reason, of course, is that we do not accord actual legal significance to any substantive conception of intragenerationai equity. In stead, we treat politics as a proxy for intragenerational equi ty, and we
110 For a gene ral discussion, see DisuibUlio na l Analysis of Tax Policy, nOle t68.
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insist on fairness of political processes rather than fairness of substantive o utcomes. As lo ng as everyone with a slak e in the o utcome has
an o pportunity to engage in the processes of governme nt-as Daryl
Levinson puts it , "[a]5 lo ng as a group can compete o n roughl y fair
terms in the pluralist political marketpl ace"171 - we treat the policy
decisions made through those processes as va lid and binding, whether
o r not everyone wo uld agree that the outcomes are equitable as a substantive matter.
But that po ints up an obvious and important limitation to the comparison of intergeneratio nal equity and intrageneratio nal equity. Future generations cannot participate in the po litical processes through
which policy decisions are made in the present that likely will affect
their interests. 112 O n the question of Social Security reform, for example, po licy opti ons th at would restore long-term program solvency
would involve the distribution of a cash burden equal to several triltion dollars over current generations, future generati ons, or both .
Curre nt generations could un dertake program reform immediately
and , at one extreme, could bear the e ntire cash burde n o f solvency
themselves o r, at the other extreme, transfer the entire cash burden of
solvency to futu re generations. In either case, the policy decision affects the inte rests of future generations, but those future generatio ns
are unable to participate in the po litical processes through which the
decision is made. This mirrors the earl y history of the Social Security
program, when the participants born before the Second World War
voted generous windfall benefits fo r themselves that wo uld be paid for
by participants who were e ith er not yet born o r simply too young to
participa te in the political process at the relevant moments.
The model that se rves intragenerational considerations well- treating the outcome of normal politica l processes as a proxy fo r substantive fa irn ess-breaks d o wn , th en, whe n int e rge neratio nal
considerations are at stake. Future generations cannot "compete o n
roughly fair terms" in the give-a nd-take of political decision making;
indeed, th ey cannot compete at all. Because of this nonre presentation
problem, there might appear to be no reason to treat the results of
po litical processes as good proxies for substantive fa irness. If po litics
is to provide a mea ningful substitute fo r a ro bust understanding of
111 Levinson. note 2, a t 1351.
m This point ofte n is made in the context of political decision ma king on ma tters having
intergenera tional effects. See, e.g., Cowen, note 68, at 6; Eric A. Posner, Agencies Sho uld
Ignore Distant·Fut ure Generations, 74 U. Chi. L. Rev. 139, 141 (2007) ("Congress and the
preside nt will support policies that benefit no nvo ting fu ture generatiOns only to the extent
that they are supported by voting members of the current generatioD."); Congressional
Budget Office, no te 120, at I.
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intergenerational equity, perhaps more than ordinary political
processes will be needed.
B.

Potential Approaches to the Nonrepreseutation Problem

The fact that the interests of future generations are affected by decisions in fiscal policy and other aspects of gove rnment policy is unavoidable; the fact that future generations cannot participate directly in
those decisions is unalterable. Familiar mechanisms for addressing
representational problems- such as redrawing the boundaries of legislative districts 173-obviously provide no solution. Arguably, however, refinement s of the political processes through which government
policy is made could mitigate the nonrepresentation problem by improving the capacity of current generat ions to take the interests of
future generations into account.
James Fishkin has proposed the idea of a deliberative opinion poll
as a means for improving the quality of political decisionmakingY4
Fishkin contrasts the deliberative opinion poll with the familiar opinion poll: "An ordinary poll models what the electorate thinks, given
how little it knows. A deliberative opinion poll models what the electorate would think if, hypothetically, it could be immersed in intensive
deliberative processes. "175 The underlying no tion is that political
decision making followin g deliberative debate among citize ns provides
superior outcomes-superior in the sense of better reflecting the public interest as a whole-than ord inary, fra gmented, majoritarian political decisionmaking. The deliberative opinion poll is a prescriptive
method for determining what the body politic as a whole would decide
on an issue if it were feasible for the body politic to e ngage in the kind
of thoughtful deliberative processes that are practicable only in small
settings. 176
Fishkin has thought seriously and deeply about the problem of intergenerational equity, but he does no t offer the idea of the deliberative opinion poll in that context. Still, if his central claim about
deliberative democracy is correct-if deliberative debate does improve the quality of political decisionmaking-it would seem reasonable to extend the idea specifically to policy questions th at pose hard
issues about the treatment of future generations. At a minimum , the
I7l Sec Bake r v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1%2) (holding tha t plaintiffS presented a justiciable
constitutional cause of action in claiming that the legislative apportionment method violated their equal protection rights).
174 See gene rally Debating Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin & PeteT LasJeu
eds., 2(03); James S. Fishkin, Democracy and Delibera tion: New Directions for Democratic Reform (1991).
m Fishk in, note 174, at 81 (emphasis in original).
176 Id.
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deliberative opinion poll and other processes aimed at improving deliberative democracy should make current generations better able to
understand and assess the interests of future generations.
Similarly, Raymond Kopp and Paul Portney propose "mock referenda" to improve pOlicymaking on issues having intergenerational effects. 177 Their notion is to provide a select group of voters with
complete information about the likely near-term and long-term effects
of various policy options in order to elicit information about those
voters' preferences. 178 Although the mock referenda mechanism is
proposed as a means of understanding the weight that current generations attach to different intergenerational effects, arguably it could be
adapted to gather information about the weight that current generations believe future generations would attach to different intergenerational effects. Again, this should improve the decisionmaking by
current generations on policy questions that unavoidably affect the interests of future generations.
These refinements to the political process have definite limitations,
however. First, both the deliberative opinion poll and the mock referendum have latent anti-democratic features related to the questions of
agenda control and voting procedures. Consider the deliberative
opinion poll. In order for this mechanism to succeed, someone must
decide what questions will be debated by the deliberative group, what
the rules for debate will be, and, once the debate has concluded, how
the deliberative opinion poll will be conducted. Similarly, the mock
referendum requires an agenda setter and a rule setter to avoid procedural chaos. In ordinary politics, these organizational questions are
addressed directly through ordinary political processes, with all the
opportunities for political participation that attend other political decisions. Because the deliberative opinion pon and the mock referendum specifically seek to transcend ordinary politics, it hardly seems
clear that ordinary political processes will be able to set the rules of
the game while ensuring the intended effects. Whoever controls the
design of a deliberative opinion poll or a mock referendum involving
intergenerational issues will have a substantial influence on whether
and how the interests of future generations are weighted.
Additionally, neither the deliberative opinion poll nor the mock referendum can provide future generations with genuine representation
in political processes. At best, these mechanisms can improve the
quality of information that current generations have about the interIn Raymond J. Kopp & Paul R. Portney, Mock Referenda for Intergenerational Decisionmaking, in Discounting and Intergenerational Equity 87 (Paul R. Portney & John P.
Weyant eds., 1999).
178 Id. a1 91~96.
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ests of future generations. Neither mech anism, however, ca n fo rce
current generations to attach any particular we ight to those interests;
and neither mechanism can remove conflicts between the interests of
current generations and future generations. 179 For exampl e, a deliberative o pinio n poll or a mock re ferendum conducted in 1939 might
have made voters at that time aware that changing Social Securi ty
from a pre fund ed to an unfunded program would shift wea lth from
(th en) future participants to (then) current participants; but even full
info rmati on on that point may not have cha nged the outcome at all:
Voters in 1939 might have given their own interests far greater weight
than the inte rests of fu ture pa rticipants, even with the improved information about the lo ng-term effects of the policy change_
Alternatively, the interests of future ge nerations could be fac to red
into the political process as a counter-majoritarian check o n certain
policy outcomes. Thus, decisions made by current gene rations that
inappropriately burden future generations could be rendered inva lid,
in much the same way that policy decisio ns inappropri ately burdening
protected gro ups are struck down.tSO Legislative precomrnitme nts on
fiscal policy matters- such as mandates fo r balanced budgets and
nondiscretionary reductions in fede ral expenditures to enfo rce those
mandates-a rguably fa ll within this category. As rece nt expe rie nce
with such mandates has established, of course, there is always a question of how tightly such precommitments actually bind policy outcomes once legislators have set their minds to working around th em.
Ignoring the enforceability problem, one could formulate a version
of such a mandate th at expressly takes the interests of futu re generations into account. For example, the lawmaking process could req uire
that fiscal policy legislation having intergenerational effects not impose a burden on any futu re generatio n greater than the largest burden impose d o n a ny current generati o n. To bring the
nonrepresentation problem to the forefro nt , sllch a requirement could
consider a "future generation" to be any generation that, by reason of
its age or by reason of not yet having been born, is not eligible to
participate in the processes of representative government and a "current gene ratio n" to be any ge neration that, by reason of its age, is
179 See a lso Sunstein & Rowell , nOle 90, at 178 (noting tha t the pOSSibility of self-interested preferences undermines attempts to dete rmine the interests of fu ture generations " by
conSUl ting the preferences of the present generatio n").
ISO This suggests a weak analogy 10 the constitutional guarantee of equal protection
when understood as " reserv[ing) specia l judicia l solicitude [or those few groups . . . that are
systematically disadvantaged by some failu re in the political market and likely to get less
than their 'fair share' of favorable outcomes. " Levinson, note 2, al 1351. For a fu ller de·
velopment of that analogy in the context of intergenerational equity, see R. George
Wright, The Interests of Posterity in the Constitutional Scheme, 59 U. Cin. L. Rev. 113
(1990).
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eligible to participate in the processes of representative government.
U nder such a requirement , if anyone current generation wanted to
impose burde ns on future generations, it must be willing to impose a
burde n of at least the same size on itself.
There are serious limitatio ns to this approach as we ll. First, it rein troduces all the normative and analytic pro blems discussed in Parts II
and III . A ny procedural mechanism inte nded as a binding precommitment to intergenerati onal equity will necessarily require the arbi trary selection of a frame for analysis (for example, all fiscal policy
legislation). A nd comparing the net burdens th at a particular item of
legislation would impose on a future generation to the ne t burdens it
would impose on current generations for the purpose of defi ning what
is a legislatively valid outcome ass um es that one can have a high degree of confidence in th e measurements themselves; as discussed
above, that confidence is misplaced in the case of quantifying inte rgenerational effects. More fundame ntally, however, this is a conceptually flawed approach to the nonrepresentation problem beca use
it does not really atte mpt to introduce the interests of futur e generations to the political process; rather, it treats those interests as unconditional trumps. In other words, it overplays the analogy between
protected groups within current generations (such as specific racial or
ethnic groups) and future generations; although trumps are appropriate in the intragenerational context of equal protection, it by no
means follows that concern for the interests of future generations
sbould suppress the right of current generations to self-de termin ati on
through th e legislati ve process.
In sum, conceivable changes to the pOlitical process would not satisfactorily address the inevit able nonrepresentation probl em prese nted
whenever present policy decisions affect the interests of future generations. Although current generations ca n be made to understand better the likely effects of their choices on future generations, current
generations cannot be made to assign any particul ar weight to those
interests. Attempting to place formal binds on legislative outcomes
reintroduces the very undesirable arbitrariness of framing and measuring; in any eve nt, such binds almost surely give too much weight to
the interests of future generations by treating those inte rests as outri ght trumps on the policy decisions of current generations. lS I

lSI See Shaviro, note 56, at 177-78 (rejecting no tion that political process can adequately
ta ke acco unt of fut ure generatio ns' interests).
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The Interests of Overlapping Generations

All the same, the seriousness of the nonrepresentation problem
should not be overstated. Current generations generally do take into
account the interests of future generations to the extent that parents
and grandparents, when participating in the political process, assess
the effects of their policy decisions on their children and grandchildren who are not yet able to vote or otherwise participate in representational government. We generally take it for granted, for example,
that parents will vote in the interests of their children on matters such
as education policy, health policy, and compulsory military service.
The fact that one generation passes along a fiscal burden to the next
generation-such as happened in the formative years of the Social Security program-does not necessarily indicate that the earli er generation ignored the interests of the later generation. Rather, it may
indicate that the earlier generation judged the burden to be fair; it
may even indicate that the earlier generation in good faith believed
that the later generation would have agreed with the judgment of the
earlier generation (bad it been possible to consult the later generation
at the time the decision was made).
This de facto guardianship on matters of public policy derives directly from the affection that parents and grandparents feel for their
children and grandchildren; no binding mechanism of political process
is needed to ensure that most parents vote for the well -being and
prosperity of their children most of the time. But this also suggests an
inherent limitation to the guardianship: Although parents may look
out sharply for the interests of their children in the political process, it
is doubtful that they are nearly so vigilant on matters that would affect
their more distant descendants. Thus, a political proposal to reinstate
compu lsory military service might arouse strong passions among parents of young chi ldren; a political proposal to limit the purchase of
gasoline so that the earth's supply of crude oil will last for an additional 100 years might seem to those same parents as nothing more
than a present economic burden that would benefit distant peoples for
whom they have little concern. The notion that current generations
inevitably will take the interests of future generations into account
through parental concern and affection suggests at most that current
generations will look one or two generations forward.
But perhaps that is sufficient. Current and future generations overlap continuously, and the tie between current and future generations
is continuously renewed as chi ldren grow to adults and have their own
children. Peter Laslett and James Fishkin use the metaphor of a pro-

292

TAX LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:

cession to account for the relations between generations;182 that image
has many implications-among them, the fact that each generation
has immediate contact with its predecessor and its successor but not
with the generations that more remotely precede or follow it. Because of this continuous contact in the procession, one can perhaps
rely on the natural affection that earlier members in the procession
have for immediately following members. If each generation looks
out for the interests of the immediately following generation until that
following generation is able to protect its own interests, the problem
of equity between the generations will have been at least partly
addressed.
The prospects for relying on political processes for resolving intergenerational concerns might be greater stil1 if each generation generally limits the scope of its policymaking, as much as possible, to
policies having only temporary effects.l 8 3 As George Yin demonstrates, temporary-effect lawmaking (such as reductions in income tax
rates that expire after a stated number of years) may increase fiscal
restraint responsibility by causing policymakers to take full account of
the effects of their fiscal policy changes. 184 Yin's pOint could be generalized: If each generation were to limit its use of the political
processes, as much as possible, to temporary-effect policymaking that
extended no further into the future than the expected lives of that
generation's children or grandchildren, we could have greater confidence that the generation in control of the political process had taken
into account many (possibly most) of the intergenerational interests
affected by its policy decisions. At any rate, there will be less cause
for concern that the ordinary processes for governance cannot resolve
questions of fairness between the generations at least as well as they
resolve questions of fairness within a single generation.
V.

CONCLUSION

Assessing fiscal policy from the perspective of intergenerational equity presents substantial problems. There are genuine limitations on
our ability to measure intergenerational effects and, importantly, a
fundamental arbitrariness in defining the relevant framework. Even a
perfect measurement of intergenerational effects, however, remains
182 Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin, Introduction: Processional Justice, in Justice Between Age Groups and Generations, note 90, at 11-14.
18) See generally George K. Yin, Temporary-Effect Legislation and Fiscal Responsibility
(unpublished manuscript); see also Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 247 (2007) (suggesling thatlemporary legislation should be lhe norm, rather than the
exception , based on historical, analytic, and empirical evidence).
184 Yin , note 183.
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useless without a robust norm of intergenerational equity to evaluate
whether those measured effects are fair. And yet the question is overwhelmingly important. Fiscal policy affects people alive today and
people who will be alive in the future, and we cannot responsibly
make decisions about those policy matters in ignorance or disregard of
how they affect future generations. The question of intergenerational
equity in fiscal policy is hard ly misplaced even though we have no
good answers. But, at a minimum, the bonds of affection between
continuously overlapping generations suggest that, as with other aspects of government policy, the fiscal policy interests of the near future generations can be taken into account through ordinary political
processes.
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